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“The Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin is currently presented with a historic 
opportunity, perhaps its last, to rectify its miserable state, thus improving the 
quality of life of millions of inhabitants and creating an important model for 
taking action in the public and private sectors, providing information to the 
public and fostering citizen participation. This model can then be applied in 
other cases throughout Argentina in hope of consolidating a new paradigm for 
sustainable development.” (Andrés M. Napoli in FARN 2009b: 88). 
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ABSTRACT  
This thesis enquires into the policy consequences of the Mendoza case, a public interest 
litigation case in Argentina, in which several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
National Ombudsman demanded action from authorities responsible for cleaning up the 
Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. The inter-jurisdictional pollution problem has existed for 
about 200 years, and it has been estimated to affect the health of more than 3.5 million people. 
However, the policymakers have mostly ignored the pollution problem. The response by the 
Supreme Court opened the political space for solving this problem. Since litigation is 
progressively being used as a strategy to hold governments accountable for implementing 
rights, it is important to assess the policy impact of litigation. This case study of the Mendoza 
case explores the dynamics in the policymaking process at all stages of the litigation process; 
from the time when a group of neighbours voiced their claims into the legal system, through 
the adjudication stage, and in the process of implementing the judgement. At all stages in the 
process the analysis identifies impact on social mobilization, policies and the policymaking 
process. The public hearings ordered by the Supreme Court initiated a process of dialogue 
between the parts in the Mendoza case. On 8 July 2008 the Supreme Court issued a landmark 
judgement that ordered the responsible authorities to implement a program of public policies 
to restore the environment, prevent future harm and improve the lives of the people living in 
the river basin area. Although the responsible authorities only to a limited extent have 
complied with the judgement, the analysis finds that the litigation has had a remarkable policy 
impact. It has also changed the policymaking process and it has had considerable indirect 
policy impact on social mobilization.  
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STAGES IN THE PROCESS IN THE MENDOZA CASE 
14.06.2004 Beatriz S. Mendoza and others presented to the Argentine Supreme Court a 
case against the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires, the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and 44 companies regarding health 
damages suffered from the environmental contamination of the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin 
20.06.2006 First Judgment issued by the Supreme Court of the Nation 
In the first Judgment the court decided to take up the collective environmental 
case, and the Court ordered the defendants to submit an Integrated Plan to 
clean the river basin 
24.08.2006 The Ombudsman’s office was accepted as third part  
30.08.2006 Four NGOs were accepted as third parties (the Environment and Natural 
Resources Foundation (FARN), the Centre for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS), the Boca Neighbourhood Association (AVLB) and Greenpeace 
Argentina)  
05.09. 2006- First public hearing  
12.09.2006 In the first round of public hearings the Integrated Plan to clean the river basin 
(PISA) and the creation of the river basin authority (ACUMAR) were 
presented 
06.02.2007 Reports were ordered from the defendant states (the National Government, the 
Province of Buenos Aires and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires) 
20.02.2007 Second public hearing 
In the second public hearing the Secretary of Environment informed about the 
progress since the plan was presented  
23.02.2007 The Supreme Court of the Nation ordered the University of Buenos Aires to 
evaluate the Integrated Plan to clean the river basin  
20.03.2007 The Citizen Association for Human Rights (ACDH) was accepted as third part 
04.07.2007- Third Public Hearing  
05.07.2007 In the third round of public hearings the relevant parties expressed their 
opinions on the Integrated Plan to clean up the river basin. 
22.08.2007 Reports were ordered from the river basin authority (ACUMAR) and the 
defendant states 
28.11.2007- Fourth public hearing  
30.11.2007 In the fourth round of public hearings all the defendants replied to the initial 
claim 
08.07.2008 The Supreme Court of the Nation handed down the landmark judgement in 
which it acknowledged the legal responsibility of the National Government, the 
Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires to improve the quality 
of life for the inhabitants of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, to clean up and 
to prevent future environmental damage in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. 
A Monitoring Committee, the “Cuerpo Colegiado,” was set up, including the 
NGOs and the Ombudsman. A federal judge at the Quilmes Court was set up to 
supervise the implementation of the judgement 
09.06.2009 Argentina was granted a loan of 840 million USD from the World Bank to 
finance parts of the project for sustainable development in the Matanza 
Riachuelo river basin 
07.07.2009 The federal judge at the Quilmes court presented progress made one year after 
the judgement. 
08.07.2009 One year since the judgement - the Monitoring Committee reported on status 
quo for implementation of the judgement 
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01.10.2009 The federal judge of the Quilmes Court ordered a detailed plan for integrated 
projects and time lines of work and actions for the different components of the 
program by 31 December 2009 
01.02.2010 The ACUMAR presented a new Integrated Plan for how to comply with the 
judgement 
01.03.2009 The Monitoring Committee published a report about the implementation 17 
months after the Judgemnt 
06.04.2010 The Supreme Court of the Nation demanded that the National Government, 
The Province of Buenos Aires, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the 
ACUMAR would have to present a study on the advancement of the work to 
clean the river basin within 15 days 
28.04.2010  ACUMAR presented the report to the Supreme Court of the Nation 
27.05.2010 The Supreme Court declared that it considered the report by the ACUMAR to 
be insufficient and ordered the responsible authorities to submit a new report 
within three days 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2009d; FARN 2010a; Centro de Información Judicial 2008, 
2009e, 2009h, 2009k, 2009a, 2010a, 2010c) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis enquires into the policy consequences of the Mendoza case, a public interest 
litigation case in Argentina, in which several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
National Ombudsman demanded action from authorities responsible for cleaning up the 
Matanza-Riachuelo river basin.  
 
Litigation is increasingly being used as a strategy to challenge national governments, and has 
since the 90’s progressively been used as a strategy to hold governments accountable for 
rights violations, such as violations of social and environmental rights (Gloppen 2008a). In 
some countries, litigation is not part of the political opportunity structure of the poor and 
marginalized. In other countries, such as in Argentina, legal support structures and rules of 
standing allow litigation by or on behalf of the poor and marginalized sections of the society
1
. 
The Argentine constitutional reform in 1994 gave several international human rights treaties 
constitutional rank, and changed the rules of standing to also allow for collective claims for 
constitutional violations (Abramovich 2009). As a result, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) in Argentina frequently use public interest litigation as a strategy to hold the political 
authorities accountable for violations of rights and legal obligations. The use of strategic 
litigation to influence political decision-making is not only common among non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Argentina; across the world we see an increasing use 
of legal strategies, parallel to a development of “judicialization” or “legalization” of politics. 
Gauri and Brinks define policy legalization as “the extent to which courts and lawyers, 
including prosecutors, become relevant actors, and the language and categories of law and 
rights become relevant concepts, in the design and implementation of public policy” (Gauri 
and Brinks 2008: 4). This definition is more narrow than Sieder’s broader definition of 
“judicialization of politics” which “encompasses the increased presence of judicial processes 
and court rulings in political and social life, and the increasing resolution of political, social or 
state-society conflicts in the courts (Sieder et al. 2005: 3). As a consequence, processes of 
legalization and judicialization change policies and the ways that policies are formed. 
Moreover, litigation may have important indirect policy impact on social and legal 
mobilization (Gloppen 2008b). Judgements often demand participation, and courts may play a 
role in the policy process. I want to explore if this happened in a particular case and, if so, 
                                                
1
 Rules of standing determine the right to bring a case to the Court, for example if organizations and individuals 
have the right to litigate on behalf of others (Gloppen 2008b: 347) 
 12 
how the policy process has changed. I will look for changes over time, and try to understand 
the process of legalization of the policy area.  
 
Litigation that is not only aimed at altering the condition for the litigants, but also for 
everyone in the same situation, that is “to change the structured inequalities and power 
relations in the society” is often referred to as public interest litigation (Gloppen 2008b). In 
this thesis I wish to investigate the policy impact of public interest litigation. More 
specifically, I want to investigate the policy impact of a very interesting and innovative case 
of public interest litigation, the so-called “Mendoza case”, which concerns environmental 
contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin in Argentina.  
 
The environmental problems of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin started more than 200 
years ago. It is estimated that the environmental pollution affects the health of more than 3.5 
million people. The environmental problem of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin is very 
complex. It is a very difficult issue, politically, socially and technically. Yet, or perhaps 
therefore, it has been systematically excluded from the political agenda. NGOs and the 
National Ombudsman had addressed the importance and severity of the problem since 2003 
(Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación et al. 2003). Despite of this, the political authorities did not 
take action to solve the problem. In 2004, Beatriz Mendoza and a group of neighbours in the 
polluted shantytown “Villa Inflamable” filed a case to the Supreme Court of the Nation. The 
case was filed against the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires and the 
autonomous City of Buenos Aires, as well as 44 companies, to hold them accountable for the 
health damages suffered because of the pollution of the environment. In 2006 the Supreme 
Court of the Nation accepted the collective environmental case, and the National Ombudsman 
and five NGOs were later accepted as third parties in the case. The Supreme Court of the 
Nation ordered the political authorities to initiate a policy process to solve the problem 
(Lorenzetti et al. 2008). But can litigation and the intervention by the Supreme Court 
contribute towards solving this 200-year-old problem, which political authorities so far have 
largely abdicated from? 
 
To clarify the policy impact of the Mendoza case is interesting beyond the case itself. It can 
contribute to our knowledge about the political consequences of litigation. In the scholarly 
literature empirical studies of the broader policy impact of public interest litigation is limited, 
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and there is a great need for more empirical studies in this area. This thesis is linked to a 
research project on health rights litigation, coordinated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).  
!"#"$%&'()*"#+,-.(
The research question is: What has been the policy impact of the litigation process in “The 
Mendoza case?”  
 
The dependent variable in the analysis is policy impact. The litigation process can lead to both 
direct and indirect policy impact. By direct policy impact I mean impact on public policies, 
impact on institutions and impact on the policymaking process. By indirect policy impact I 
mean impact on rights awareness, rights acknowledgement, legal and social mobilization on 
environmental rights, media attention, and impact on the political discourse. The dependent 
variable, the policy impact, could also be seen as the last stage in an integrated litigation 
process. However, rather than talking about measuring the impact of an independent variable 
(litigation process) on a dependent variable (policy impact), it would be better to say that I 
want to explore the dynamics in the policy process, and understand how litigation influence 
policy. I will carry out an explorative analytical description of the case, look for process 
indicators, and try to understand if and, if that is the case, how the litigation process has 
changed policies and the policy process. 
 
In order to analyze the policy impact of the litigation process I will apply an analytical 
framework developed by Gloppen. The central argument in the analytical framework is that 
the outcome of the litigation process can be explained based on variations in the four stages of 
the litigation process. The framework identifies a set of factors that are believed to influence 
the outcome at each stage. At the first stage the victims of rights violations voice their claims 
into the legal system. At the second stage, the court responds to these claims. At the third 
stage the judges must be capable of finding judicial remedies to the claims presented. 
However, even if the court may find suitable remedies, the relevant authorities must comply 
with and implement the judgement for the judgement to have effect on policies. Many of the 
factors interact across the stages in the process. Therefore, each stage must be seen as part of 
the litigation process, not in isolation. The four stages in the process could also be seen as 
intermediate variables or nexuses that link together a “complex web of institutions and 
practices” that have an impact on the litigation process and the outcome on policy change 
(Gloppen 2006: 43). An analysis of the litigation process based on this framework will give us 
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a better understanding of the complex processes that can explain the political consequences of 
litigation.  
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It will always be a problem to establish a clear causation between the litigation process and 
the observed changes in policies. In order to get a better understanding of the causal 
complexities I will argue that an in-depth qualitative case study based on an analytical 
framework is the most suitable methodological approach to answer the research question. 
Moreover, the broader indirect policy impact cannot be assessed by applying strict causality 
tests, and can only be investigated through a qualitative approach. In order to do a systematic 
assessment of the broader policy impact of litigation, I will present and apply Rodriguez-
Garavito’s typology for assessing the direct, indirect, material and symbolic effects of 
litigation (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010).  The case study must also identify the context in which 
the litigation process took place in order to not give too much or too little weight to litigation 
in explaining policy changes. In order to assess changes in policies, we must have a reference 
point. The reference point is Argentina’s environmental policies and how the pollution 
problem of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin has been dealt with before the case was filed to 
court.  
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In chapter two, I first present a brief literature review on previous research on the policy 
impact of social rights litigation. Then I give a brief introduction to rights and accountability 
mechanisms in a democracy before going on to clarify central concepts; explain the ways in 
which litigation may influence public policies and the policy process, and present the 
analytical framework for analyzing the litigation process. A typology developed to analyze 
the policy impact of a structural judgement in Colombia will be applied in order to facilitate 
future comparative studies on the policy impact of structural judgements. A structural 
judgement is a judgement in which “they order authorities to initiate a process to develop new 
legislation, policies, and plans to remedy a rights violation within parameters set by the 
judges” (Gloppen 2008a: 29). In chapter 3 I explain and reflect on the choice of 
methodological approach and present my data sources.  
 
Then I go on to the main part of the thesis; the analysis of the policy impact of the litigation 
process in the Mendoza case. This thesis has a clear empirical focus. In order to identify the 
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policy changes, we must know the situation before the case was accepted by the Supreme 
Court. Therefore, in chapter 4, I will explain the political context including some trends in 
Argentine environmental policies, and the reasons for the complex environmental pollution 
problem in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. I will also outline earlier attempts to solve the 
problem. In chapter 5 I will carry out the in-depth analysis of the litigation process according 
to the analytical framework. In chapter 6 I will proceed to do a more systematic assessment of 
the direct, indirect, material and symbolic policy impact of the litigation process. There is 
always the danger of ascribing too much or too little weight to litigation when explaining 
observed changes in policies. Therefore, it is important to place the litigation process into a 
context of other simultaneous processes in Argentina that may also be part of the explanation 
for the observed changes in policies. After an assessment of policy impact I will sum up the 
results in the typology for assessing policy impact. In an analysis of the broader impact of the 
Mendoza case it is also interesting to include a brief discussion on the role of courts in 
enforcing social rights. In the conclusion I will sum up the results of the analysis, and discuss 
its applicability and implications for further research on policy impact of public interest 
litigation.   
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CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING POLICY 
IMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION  
8,+"%$+*%"(%"5,"9(
Literature on social rights jurisprudence has evolved rapidly as courts in several countries has 
taken up cases that deals with social rights violations (Langford 2008). Likewise, 
environmental jurisprudence has been developed as courts accept claims of violations of 
environmental rights. Much of the literature on social rights litigation tend to focus on the 
adjudication phase of the litigation process, and not the actual impact and implementation of 
court rulings (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 1). However, recent research on legal enforcement of 
social rights has turned towards a broader approach that also considers implementation of the 
court rulings and the relationship between advances of social rights through litigation and 
other forms of social mobilization (Gloppen 2009: 465).  
 
There is an established literature that discusses on a more theoretical basis the challenges of 
implementing court-enforced social rights, such as works by Roberto Gargarella on theories 
of democracy, the judiciary and social rights of the judiciary (Gloppen 2009: 465; Gargarella 
2006). There is also an established literature that examines the (lack of) implementation and 
the social effects of public interest litigation generally, mainly from the North American 
empirical context (Gloppen 2009: 465). Literature on the impact of judicial decisions, and 
studies on how to measure the impact of transforming a political controversy into litigation, 
can be classified into two groups. One group adopt a neorealist perspective, and the other 
group adopt a more interpretive vision of the relationship between law and society, depending 
on what type of effects they focus on (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 2).  
 
A neorealist perspective views law as a set of norms that shapes human conduct and research 
within the neorealist approach often apply a strict causality test to measure the impact of 
judicial interventions. From this view, a judgement is effective if it has produced an 
observable change in the behaviour of those individuals, groups or institutions that the 
litigants and judges hope to influence through their strategies and decisions. The most 
influential work that employs this methodology is that of Gerald Rosenberg (1991) on the 
effects of the United States Supreme Court’s decision on Brown vs. Board of Education from 
1954. Rosenberg’s empirical study concluded that public authorities in the southern states 
 17 
resisted compliance with the judgement, and consequently the judgement had little effect. On 
the contrary, the dominant view of the Brown vs. Board of Education judgement sees this 
judgment as revolutionizing race relations in the United States and as contributing to the birth 
of the civil rights movements in the 1960s (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 2).
2
 
 
Researchers inspired by a more interpretive vision of the relationship between law and society 
have criticised Rosenberg and researchers within the neorealist tradition for focusing on only 
the material and direct effects of judgements and human rights litigation.  The key influential 
work that employs the interpretive approach is Michael McCann’s study (1994) on the effects 
of legal strategies by the feminist movement in fighting for salary equality in the United 
States. As opposed to Rosenberg, McCann argues that the indirect effects of litigation and 
judicial activism may sometimes be more important than the direct effects that neorealist 
researches tend to focus on. According to the interpretive criticism of a neorealist view, law 
and judicial decisions may lead to social transformation not only when they bring about 
changes in the conduct of those directly involved in the case, but also when they produce 
indirect transformations in social relations, or when they change the perceptions of the social 
actors and legitimate the worldviews promoted by the litigants (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 3).  
 
An important contribution to the literature on Social rights litigation is Courting Social 
Justice, edited by Varun Gauri and Daniel Brinks (Gauri and Brinks 2008). Yet, even in this 
work, that does have an interpretive view on impact of judicial decisions and that address the 
potential direct and indirect policy impact of public interest litigation, in-depth empirical 
studies of broader policy impact of litigation cases are limited. More empirically-based 
studies that investigate the effects of social rights litigation is therefore needed
3
 (Gloppen 
2009: 465).  
 
                                                
2
 Rosenberg (1991) concluded in another analysis of the political influence of courts in the United States that 
courts are constrained actors, and are generally unable to influence policy on their own. They depend, according 
to him, on other actors to take advantage of the judgement. Analyses of courts elsewhere support this conclusion, 
but this does not mean that litigation has no power as a policy-shaping instrument (Gloppen 2008b: 357).  
3
 Several research projects, such as “Accountability functions of courts”, “Courts and the poor” and “Litigating 
the rights to health” coordinated by Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) have gathered scholars from various 
disciplines to carry out comparative studies on the role of courts in democracies and social rights litigation 
(Gloppen 2009, 2008a; Gargarella et al. 2006; Gloppen et al. 2010; Skaar et al. 2004).  
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Increasingly, courts tend to develop “structural judgements.” In a structural judgement the 
court orders the authorities to initiate a process to develop new legislation, polices, and plans 
to remedy violation of rights (Gloppen 2008a: 29). The Mendoza case represents a structural 
judgement. Few empirical analyses exist on the policy impact of structural judgement until 
this date, but one important contribution to empirical studies on a broader policy impact 
assessment of structural judicial decisions is Rodriguez-Garavito’s (2010) analysis of the 
impact and implementation of a structural judgment by the Colombian Constitutional Court 
(T-025 of 2004) on the rights of forcefully displaced people (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010; 
Garavito and Franco 2009). In-depth studies of policy level impact give an important insight 
into the complex dynamics at the intersection between law and politics caused by public 
interest litigation. The analysis of the Mendoza case will therefore, along with the impact 
assessment of the structural judgement regarding the rights of forcefully displaced people in 
Colombia, be an important contribution to empirical-based academic literature on policy 
impact of litigation. Before moving on to present the analytical framework, I will explain how 
rights and accountability mechanisms form the basis for using public interest litigation as a 
strategy to hold governments accountable for violations of rights.  
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Rights 
Rights form the basis for making legal claims, and accountability mechanisms form the 
institutional relationship that makes it possible (at least in theory) to realize these rights in 
practise. Constitutions set out fundamental rights, and create therefore legal constraints to 
what policymakers can do. Right violations form the legal basis for going to court. Rights 
could be based on the rights in the constitution, by signing of international covenants and 
treaties that are legally binding, by giving international human right treaties constitutional 
rank, by statutory law, national law, provincial law, case law etc. Laws are often wide, and 
interpretation creates challenges for both judges and policymakers. Development of 
(international) jurisprudence may also influence the way that courts deal with social rights. 
Also, successful litigation in one country may inspire people in other countries to go to court 
based on similar rights violations.  
 
Although a right is set out formally, it does not necessarily mean that authorities have 
implemented the rights in terms of changes in policies. Many resource poor countries have 
rights extensive constitutions, and may include (or give constitutional rank to) international 
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human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the human right to a healthy environment. This might lead to high 
expectations that cannot be fulfilled within their resource constraints. One result of this gap 
between rights and policy delivered is the use of litigation to hold governments accountable 
(Gloppen 2008a). In order to understand how the litigation can be a strategy to hold the 
governments accountable for implementing rights, the concept of accountability and the 
accountability mechanisms in a democracy must be clarified.  
 
Accountability mechanisms in a democracy 
The concept of accountability involves a two-way relationship between citizens and rulers 
that have been given a mandate to rule, and is about holding actors responsible for their 
actions. Accountability mechanisms apply checks, oversight and institutional constraints on 
the exercise of power (Newell 2006: 40). Accountability is in the literature commonly 
understood to involve the following three criteria: transparency, answerability and 
controllability. Transparency and answerability refer to the obligation of the rulers to give 
answers and justify their actions. Controllability involves the possibility to sanction if 
performance or justification is poor (Gloppen 2008a: 22). Accountability mechanisms make it 
possible to make authorities justify their actions and sanction them if they do not. There are 
several accountability mechanisms in a democracy. It is common to make a distinction 
between vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms.  
 
Horizontal accountability mechanisms enable the judiciary, the legislative and the executive 
to control and constrain each other. The fundamental principle behind the horizontal 
accountability mechanisms is to enable institutions with different responsibilities to control 
each other in order to avoid the abuse of power. The judiciary holds a “horizontal” 
accountability function to prevent abuse of power, to secure fundamental rights and to make 
sure that the legislative and executive respect the “rules of the game.” In addition to the 
courts, most modern democracies also have other independent special institutions such as the 
Ombudsman’s Office and the Office of the Auditor General. The role of the Office of the 
Auditor General is to secure economic accountability, and the role of the Ombudsman’s 
Office is to handle complaints by people who claim that their rights have not been respected 
(Gloppen 2004: 61). 
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While horizontal mechanisms enable the different branches of the government to control and 
constrain each other, vertical accountability mechanisms enable people to hold rulers 
accountable for their leadership, The main vertical accountability mechanism is elections, 
which are often seen as the institutional core of democracy (Gloppen 2004: 54-56). If rulers 
do not rule according to the mandate they are given, voters can sanction them at the next 
elections (if the candidates can be re-elected). However, free and fair multiparty elections do 
no guarantee good governance – many democracies struggle with informal practices that lead 
to violations of rights and abuse of powers (Newell 2006: 42).  
 
In the more traditional understanding of the concept of accountability, civil society has to a 
large extent been ignored. Smulovitz and Peruzzotti  (2000) argue that “Studying civil 
society’s efforts to hold government in check can shed new light on current debates on 
democracy and accountability by bringing into the analysis a realm of previously ignored 
activities that may compensate for many of the built-in deficits of traditional mechanisms” 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: 149-150). They use the term “Societal accountability” to 
refer to” a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control that rests on the actions of a 
multiple array of citizens’ associations and movements and on the media, actions that aim at 
exposing governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues onto the public agenda, or activating 
the operation of horizontal agencies” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: 149-150).! Societal 
accountability mechanisms involve both institutional and non-institutional tools. Litigation, or 
filing claims to oversight agencies such as the Ombudsman’s office or Human Rights 
Commissions represent institutionalized tools, whereas social mobilization and media 
reporting represent non-institutional societal accountability tools. These strategies are often 
combined in a wider strategy for social mobilization, as in public interest litigation. 
 
However, formal barriers such as rules of standing, or informal barriers such as lack of 
financial resources and legal illiteracy, can create obstacles for legal mobilization for poor and 
marginalized, and disable legal strategies to be part of their political opportunity structure. 
Opportunity situation refers to the formal (or systemic) and informal barriers that define them 
as litigants in the legal process (Gloppen 2008b: 346). Peoples’ political opportunity structure 
determines the extent to which the different vertical accountability mechanisms may be used. 
Courts play an important role as a vertical and horizontal accountability mechanism. Seen in 
the perspective of rights, resources and accountability, several resource-poor countries have 
rights extensive constitutions, and also give constitutional rank to international treaties such 
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as the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). This may 
lead to very high expectations which governments are unable to deliver within their resource 
constraints. A gap between formal rights and policies that do not correspond to the formal 
rights (policy gap) may lead to widespread use of litigation as a strategy to hold governments 
accountable for implementing their rights.  
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I choose to apply the typology for impact assessment of litigation presented by Rodriguez-
Garavito because it represents the only previous impact assessment for structural judgements. 
I find this approach very useful for my analysis, and I will apply this typology for analyzing 
the policy impact of the Mendoza case.
4
 However, I also find that Gloppen’s analytical 
framework for investigating the potential of public interest litigation to advance rights and 
channel the voices of marginalized people into policy processes an important tool, because it 
adds some important points that are not included clearly in the typology presented by 
Rodriguez-Garavito (2010) What I see as a particular strength by Gloppen’s framework is that 
it in a more comprehensive way shows that impact on policy and systemic change is a product 
of the litigation process and not only the judicial decision.
5
 Together, these analytical tools 
will provide a good basis for analyzing the policy impact of the Mendoza case. 
 
I find it useful to apply Siri Gloppen’s (2008a, 2006, 2008b) framework to carry out a 
descriptive analyze of the litigation process in the Mendoza case. In analyzing the impact of a 
court ruling, it is important to understand that the litigation process includes several stages; 
claims formation, adjudication and implementation. Gauri and Brinks (2008) demonstrate 
similar stages in the process, and all though they are labelled differently, the process they 
describe is basically the same. It is important to analyze all the stages of the litigation process 
in order to assess its broader policy impact, because at every stage of the litigation process 
legal strategies and outcomes may influence social mobilization and public debate. In the 
analysis of the litigation process in the Mendoza case I will apply Gloppen’s analytical 
framework, doing a descriptive analysis of all the stages in the process, that is to say (a) 
Marginalized groups’ voice, (b) Courts’ responsiveness, (c) Judges’ capability, (d) 
Authorities’ compliance and implementation and (d) Policy change (Gloppen 2008b). 
                                                
4
 This typology will be further explained later. 
5
 This framework will be explained in detail below 
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Figure 1: A new view on litigation: broader avenues of potential influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Social rights cases brought to court. 
b. Cases accepted by the courts. 
c. Judgments giving effect to social rights 
d. Transformation effect (effect on social rights and inclusion of marginalized groups) 
Thin arrows: indirect effects on social mobilization 
Source: Public Interest Litigation, Social Rights, and Social Policy by Gloppen (Gloppen 2008b: 355) 
 
The analytical framework presented here provides a good basis for the analysis of the 
Mendoza case. At each of the four stages Gloppen (2006) defines a set of process indicators 
that determine the outcome of each stage - factors that collectively enable or prevent success 
at each stage in the litigation process. At the first stage the victims of rights violations (or 
someone speaking on their behalf) must voice their claims into the legal system. At the 
second stage, the court responds to these claims. Then judges must be capable of finding 
judicial remedies to the claims presented. However, although the court may find suitable 
remedies, for the judgement to have effect the relevant authorities must comply with and 
implement the terms of the judgement. Factors at each of the stages interact and determine the 
outcome of the litigation process. The central argument in the analytical framework is that the 
outcome of the litigation process can be explained based on variations in the four stages of the 
litigation process. However, as Gloppen argues, the four stages could also be seen as 
intermediate variables or nexuses that link together a complex web of institutions and 
practices that have an impact on the litigation process and the outcome in terms of the courts’ 
ability to be a mechanism for social transformation (Gloppen 2006: 43). Several of the 
process indicators in the analytical framework are relevant at various stages, and many of the 
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factors interact across the four stages in the process. The process indicators in the analytical 
framework will be used as a checklist rather than a strict analytical structure. Therefore, not 
all process indicators in the framework will be discussed in the analysis if they are not 
considered relevant. 
 
The analytical framework presented below is based on “Courts and social transformation: an 
analytical framework” (Gloppen 2006) and the analytical frameworks presented in “Public 
Interest Litigation, Social Rights and Social Policy” (Gloppen 2008b) and “Litigation as a 
strategy to hold governments accountable for implementing the right to health” (Gloppen 
2008a). They all describe the same processes, but from different perspectives. In this 
presentation I include aspects from the three frameworks.   
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First of all, the legal claims must be voiced into the legal system. The outcome of this stage is 
the (quality and) strength of the voice. Several factors in the analytical framework are 
believed to influence the strength and quality of the voice. These factors involve both the 
social and political context, the institutional structure of the legal system, and the resources 
available for victims of rights violations. The victims of rights violations must be aware that 
they have rights (they must be legally literate) and know that it is possible to voice their claim 
into the legal system. In order to understand what enable litigants to take the case to court we 
have to know their opportunity situation.  
 
Formal and informal barriers to voicing claims into the legal system determine the 
opportunity situation. Barriers to access can be both practical and motivational. Practical 
barriers may be for example costs of filing a case, rules of standing, geographical distance to 
court, language challenges and lack of information. The motivational barriers may be 
(dis)trust of the legal system, fear, social and cultural distance and peoples’ experience or 
perceptions of the courts’ performance and relevance of court decisions, corruption or bias. 
Whether or not legal strategies are chosen depends on what other opportunities for social 
mobilization that exists, and the experienced or perceived effects of alternative strategies to 
articulate their rights. Alternative strategies may be elections, media, demonstrations, 
lobbying, ombudsman, human rights commissions etc. If these strategies are considered more 
effective, legal strategies may be discouraged. On the contrary, legal strategies may be 
encouraged if other strategies are not experienced as being effective.  
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Often where legal strategies are used, the voice is strengthened by the use of media and a 
broader strategy of social mobilization accompanying the litigation. The strength of voice is 
also influenced by the “associative capacity” of the victims – the ability by the parts in the 
lawsuit to join their forces to mobilize collectively and find expertise and financial resources 
(Gloppen 2006: 47). This is a very important variable, particularly in cases where several 
parts are involved. Some scholars also put emphasis on the role of external actors, such as 
international human rights networks (Sikkink 2005). The strength of voice depends on the 
victims’ resources to articulate and mobilize around their claims. In cases where poor and 
marginalized groups’ rights are violated, and they lack the sufficient resources to voice their 
claim into the legal system, the existence of legal support structures such as legal aid, legal 
advice and pro-bono litigation are important. Both the existence and the quality of these 
services influence the strength of voice.  
 
Access to courts also depends on the nature of the legal system. First of all, there must be a 
legal basis for going to court in the constitutional or legal framework of the country. 
Secondly, the court must see the case to be under their jurisdiction. Thirdly, rules of standing 
are important, because they define who are able to voice their legal claims to court. The rules 
of standing decide whether or not class actions (“amparo colectivo” in Argenina) are possible 
or whether or not the rules of standing allow NGOs, the Ombudsman or others to litigate on 
behalf of the poor and marginalized. What is also important is whether or not the rules of 
standing allow litigation in the public interest, litigation that is aimed at changing the situation 
for both litigants and everyone in the same situation. Another feature of the legal system that 
is relevant is whether it is possible to file cases directly to higher courts and criteria for doing 
so. These aspects of the legal system will have an effect on both the victims’ voice, the courts’ 
responsiveness and on judges’ capability and authorities’ compliance (Gloppen 2008a: 27-28; 
2006: 45-49, 43; 2008b: 346-349).  
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For litigation to be a successful strategy for social transformation, the court must be 
responsive to the claims that are voiced.  The response of the court potentially depends on a 
range of factors, one of which is the strength of the litigant’s voice – the outcome of the first 
stage. A second factor is the legal basis for the claim; the judges must recognize the claims as 
legitimate for the court to decide and be within their jurisdiction. The response by the court 
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also in part depends on the merits of the case itself, and on the judges’ sensitivity (collectively 
or individually) to the concerns that are voiced, which is again influenced by their social and 
economic background, education and training. The courts’ responsiveness is also related to 
the nature of the legal system, including the legal framework and the formal position of the 
rights in question, in this case of social and environmental rights. In some countries social and 
environmental rights are included in the constitution or international treaties recognizing the 
rights are given constitutional status, while in other countries this is not the case – or even if 
the rights are formally included, judges do not necessarily see them as legally binding or 
justiciable. The competence, education and training of the judges may also affect the response 
of the court. Another factor that may influence the response of the court is the legal culture. 
The dominant norms of appropriateness and views on the relation between law and politics 
are factors in the legal culture that may influence the response of the court. Legal culture will 
affect how judges interpret the law, and therefore both courts’ responsiveness and the judges’ 
capability. The output indicator at this stage, the courts’ responsiveness, is the extent to 
which the court is responsive to the claims that were voiced, and accept them as matters for 
the court to legitimately decide (Gloppen 2008b: 349-351; 2006: 49-51, 43; 2008a: 28-29). 
B*02"#@(&$3$:,1,+6(
This stage is about the judges’ capability to handle the rights issues that are voiced, and to 
find judicial remedies to restore the rights violations. Several factors affect both the 
responsiveness of the court and the capability of the judges to find effective remedies, and 
these two stages are somewhat difficult to distinguish (they are often together labelled 
adjudication stage). In finding judicial remedies to rights violations judges have several 
possibilities, ranging from issuing declaratory judgements that state rights violations and 
order authorities to respect the rights, to giving mandatory orders in which specific remedies 
are authorized. Courts may also issue supervisory orders that require parties to report back 
within set time-frames. Increasingly courts have started to develop structural judgements that 
require authorities to start a process to develop new legislation, policies, and plans to remedy 
violations of rights (Gloppen 2008a: 29). In some cases judges can choose to give unorthodox 
orders and make innovative judgements. The choice of remedies depends on a range of 
factors, and brings into question how much room judges should leave for politics.  
 
The nature of the judgement may influence the likelihood of compliance and implementation 
of the judgement. Substantive law will influence the choice of remedies. In additions to the 
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factors in the legal culture mentioned above, dominant theories of judicial/legal and 
constitutional interpretation within the legal culture are likely to influence how judges 
interpret the law. Jurisprudential resources developed in other cases may also influence both 
courts’ responsiveness to the claims that are voiced and the judges’ ability to find adequate 
remedies. This may also be provided by skilled litigants or litigants with professional legal 
assistance. The composition of the bench will affect both the courts’ responsiveness and the 
capability of judges to find judicial remedies. The social and economic background of the 
judges, their education and legal training could influence their decisions. The formal 
competence of the court will also influence their capability to find adequate remedies. Judges’ 
professional skills and sensitisation to the rights in question may influence both the 
responsiveness by the court and the capability of judges. Skills and sensitisation will again be 
influenced by the education and sensitivity training they have had on the rights in question 
(Gloppen 2006: 51-52).  
 
Courts often have a large caseload, and resources such as research capacity, budgets and 
infrastructure will also influence the capability of judges to find effective judicial remedies. 
Judicial (in) dependence from the government and from other dominant forces in the society 
may influence judges’ capability to find appropriate remedies. Nevertheless, even though 
judges are capable in finding effective judicial remedies, they may not be willing to do so 
because they may be afraid of losing their position due to appointment procedures/criteria, 
tenure and conditions, or because of political pressure, economic elites, pressure groups, 
lobby, demonstrations, advocacy etc. Participation in professional forums may improve the 
judges’ professionalism and independence (Gloppen 2006: 51-53). “It is important to explore 
the interactions between the different branches of power to see whether there is a dynamic of 
“mutual interference,” “dialogue” or “confrontation” between them, as well as between higher 
and inferior courts” (Gloppen 2006: 52). The outcome indicator at this stage, the judges’ 
capability, is the extent to which the legal claims accepted by the court result in 
“transformative rulings” meaning judgements that lead to changes in policies (Gloppen 
2008a: 28-29; 2008b: 351-354; 2006: 51-53). 
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If judgements are to lead to changes on the ground, the terms of the judgement must be 
complied with and implemented by the relevant authorities. The following variables are 
expected to influence compliance with the judgement.  
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The first set of factors that influence the outcome on compliance has to do with what the court 
does. First of all, the judgement must be perceived as authoritative by the implementing 
authorities. The nature of the judgment itself and the type of order is likely to influence to 
what extent it is being implemented by the authorities. One hypothesis is that, all else equal, 
detailed and restrictive orders are more likely to be implemented (Gloppen 2008a). Dialogic 
judgements leave more room for politics and deliberation than direct orders. Berger argues 
that negotiated orders in dialogic judgements are more likely to be complied with than 
judgements made by the judiciary alone (Gauri and Brinks 2008: 322) . Secondly, the 
existence of official enforcement mechanisms is one important factor that may influence the 
degree of compliance. Enforcement mechanisms can be included in the judgement, such as 
penalties if the judgement is not complied with. Also, the court can give supervisory orders 
and set up monitoring committees in charge of following up the judgement, or the court may 
itself have a supervisory/monitoring role. One hypothesis is that the presence and strength of 
official enforcement mechanisms have a positive impact on compliance. The independence of 
the judiciary and the courts’ legitimacy may also have an impact on how the political 
authorities respond to a judgement. Finally, the ability of the court to balance political forces 
is believed to be important for compliance (Gloppen 2006: 53-56).  
 
What the court itself does is important. However, as Alexander Hamilton said; ”The courts 
control neither the sword nor the purse, and thus, they rely on the other branches of 
government to enforce their orders” (Cited in Gauri and Brinks 2008: 18). Several factors 
outside the control of the court influence the degree to which authorities comply with the 
judgement. Some of the factors outside the legal system that affect authorities’ compliance are 
the economic context, the level of state formation and the capacity of the state (Gloppen 2006: 
53-56). Important factors here are the government or implementing institution’s scope of 
authority and resources, financially, institutionally and administratively. Limited resources are 
likely to limit the extent to which the authorities will comply with the judgment (Gloppen 
2008a). But while sufficient resources are necessary for the (progressive) realization of the 
judgment, it is not sufficient; it is also a matter of motivation and political will. 
 
Regarding the political context, the balance of power within the government is an important 
factor. If the judgement is believed to be too costly to implement economically or politically, 
it will decrease the likelihood of compliance, including if it is in conflict with broader policy 
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goals. On the other hand, the likelihood of voluntary compliance increases if there is internal 
support for the judgement in the government and/or implementing authority (for example 
when a judgments fits their political and ideological views); where significant opposition 
forces support the judgement; and/or where there is a supportive political-legal culture. Where 
there is a strong culture of legalism, compliance is likely even when judgments contradict the 
preferences of the implementing authorities. Political will from the government is not always 
sufficient to secure implementation. Power structures in the society also affects the extent to 
which the judgement will be complied with (Gloppen 2006: 53-56). An important part of 
analysing the implementation process and compliance is to identify the external actors who 
may seek to influence the implementation process, i.e. the political opposition, activists, 
industry lobbyists etc (Gloppen 2008a). This is because it is important to try to understand 
who has an interest in whether the judgement is implemented or not and who may use the 
judgement as a way of seeking to change policies (Gloppen 2008a).  
 
Another set of variables has to do with unofficial enforcement mechanisms and what litigants 
and other actors outside the court do. The actors could be individuals, NGOs, social 
movements, monitoring agencies and official enforcement mechanisms such as human rights 
commissions and the ombudsman’s office. Follow-up litigation is believed to increase the 
likelihood that the judgment will lead to compliance and policy change, as well as 
mobilization out of court. What takes place in the courtroom is often only one aspect of a 
broader process (Gloppen 2008b: 354). Public interest litigation by NGOs often include a 
wider strategy for social mobilization, involving demonstrations and political pressure, use of 
media, advocacy and lobbying to create discourse on issues such as social rights violations, 
and to create legal literacy and consciousness. They often monitor and follow up when 
compliance is lacking. One hypothesis is that litigation that forms part of broader strategy of 
mobilization is more likely to cause policy change (Gloppen 2008b: 355-356; 2008a: 29-31; 
2006: 53-56). 
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The independent variable in the analysis is the litigation process, and the dependent variable 
is policy impact. However, as I argued in the introduction, rather than talking about dependent 
and independent variables I find it more accurate to say that I will explore the dynamics in the 
litigation process in order to assess the policy impact of the litigation process.  
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As Gloppen argues, three types of dynamics are particularly important for the policy impact 
of litigation. These are: (a) the direct influence of the judgement on political actors, (b) the 
relationship between litigation and social mobilization and (c) the role of litigation in 
influencing public discourse on the rights in question. Litigation have effects on social 
mobilization, generate public debate, and lead to changes in policies even if the case is lost in 
court (Gloppen 2008b: 355-358). Similarly, Rodriguez-Garavito argues that even if a 
judgement only is complied with to a limited extent the policy impact may be significant 
(Rodriguez-Garavito 2010). Gloppen argues that to assess the potential of litigation as a 
strategy to advance rights in the society, “it is necessary to go beyond an assessment of direct 
compliance and consider the dynamics that shape the structural impact of litigation” (Gloppen 
2008a: 30). 
 
According to Gloppen (2008a), policy impact includes both impacts on public policies and 
impacts on the policymaking process. A thick description of the litigation process will give an 
understanding of the dynamics in the litigation process and show how the implementation of 
the judgement lead to changes in policies and in the policymaking process. Changes in the 
policymaking process may be that new procedures for resolving disputes are settled (Mæstad 
and Rakner 2009). 
 
Both  (Gloppen 2008b) and (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010) claim that litigation can influence 
public policies both directly and indirectly. Direct policy impact happen when public policies 
are formulated or reformulated as part of the implementation process. Another direct policy 
impact is changes in budgetary allocations, greater transparency and access to information 
(Mæstad and Rakner 2009). In other words, direct policy impact happen when the judgement 
change the conduct of the actors involved in the lawsuit, either litigants, beneficiaries or the 
target of the litigation (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010). An example is when the responsible 
authorities change their response to demands. In public interest litigation the political 
authorities are most often the target of the litigation. Indirect policy impact includes, 
according to Rodriguez-Garavito, all kinds of consequences that, without being ordered in the 
judicial decision, still originate from the decision by the court. The indirect effects may not 
only affect the actors in the case, but also other social actors. Also in Gloppen’s framework, 
the litigation process may have an indirect policy effect on social mobilization, as indicated 
by the arrows pointing downwards in figure 1. The indirect effects could be to stimulate social 
mobilization around the rights that are being violated by framing the complaints of the 
 30 
marginalized people in terms of violations of rights. Therefore, litigation may create rights 
awareness and encourage advocacy. Litigation may also create media attention and bring the 
topic of rights into the social and political discourse and lead to changes in the degree of 
public deliberation (Gloppen 2008b: 357; Mæstad and Rakner 2009). 
 
Rodriguez-Garavito (2010) also distinguishes between material and symbolic effects of 
judicial decisions. Material effects imply changes in the behavior of groups or individuals. 
Symbolic effects consist of changes in ideas, perceptions and collective social constructs that 
relate to the situation of the litigants. I find this typology useful for mapping and 
systematizing the results of the analysis of the Mendoza case. As shown in table 1 below, it 
distinguishes between direct and indirect effects, as well as material and symbolic effects, 
which give rise to four model types of effects of judicial decisions: 
 
Table 1: Types and examples of effects of judicial decisions  
    Direct    Indirect 
 
Material 
 
 
 
Symbolic 
 
 
 
Source: Rodriguez-Garavito (2010: 4). 
 
As this model shows, the intersection of these two classifications may lead to four types of 
effects: direct material effects; indirect material effects; direct symbolic effects and indirect 
symbolic effects: 
 
(1) Direct material effects are, for example, the promulgation of a norm, formulation of a 
policy or execution of a public work that was ordered by the judge. (2) Indirect material 
effects could be for instance that new social actors emerge in the public debate, such as 
NGOs, donors, and public entities that were drawn in by the advocacy opportunities created 
by the court decision.  (3) Direct symbolic effects could for instance be a change in the public 
 
Designing public policy as 
ordered by the decision 
 
Forming coalition of activists to 
influence the subject of the 
decision 
 
Defining and perceiving the 
problem as a violation of rights. 
 
Transforming public opinion 
about the urgency and gravity 
of the problem. 
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perception of the problem, so that it becomes understood in the legal framework used by the 
courts. Finally, (4) indirect symbolic effects could be to legitimize the litigant’s view of the 
problem in question or to transform the public opinion about the gravity or urgency of the 
problem (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 5). In analyzing the policy effects of the litigation 
process in the Mendoza case I find Rodriguez-Garavito’s typology very useful, and after the 
descriptive analysis of the litigation process in the Mendoza case, the different types of policy 
impact will be presented in a four model typology. Assessing the indirect impact of the 
litigation process is troubled with more uncertainty than assessing the more direct effects of 
litigation. This methodological challenge will be discussed later. 
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In Theories of Democracy, the Judiciary and Social Rights, Roberto Gargarella (2006) 
challenges some of the arguments against the judicial enforcement of social rights found in 
democratic theories. “The conclusion most commonly reached is that due respect for 
democracy requires judges not to enforce social rights” (Gargarella 2006: 13). The main 
objections against judicial enforcement of social rights are the so-called “separation of 
powers-objection” and “the democratic-objection.” The “separation of powers-objection” says 
that judges should not enforce social rights, because they would thereby interfere with the 
tasks that belong to the representatives of the people and thereby break the equilibrium and 
distribution of powers between the different branches of government. The “democratic-
objection” is linked to the other one, and has to do with the lack of legitimacy for judges to 
intervene with questions regarding public policies (Gargarella 2010). Gargarella suggests  “a 
third approach to social rights, one that is more favourable to judicial enforcement, based on a 
deliberative conception of democracy” (Gargarella 2006: 13).  
 
A deliberative conception of democracy requires public decisions to be made after an ample 
process of collective discussion, and it requires participation of everyone potentially affected 
by the decision (Gargarella 2006: 27). Gargarella argues that deliberative democrats would 
neither support judicial activism nor complete judicial passivity. What would be required, 
instead, “is an active intervention of the judiciary in certain occasions, and in specific, 
justified manners.” Among the reasons Gargarella mentions are: (a) the connection between 
basic rights (the right to question the government) and preservation of the democratic 
procedures, (b) the connection between social right and political participation and (c) the 
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obligation to obey the constitution (particularly if the constitution is explicit regarding social 
rights) (Gargarella 2010: 5). Gargarella argues that: 
“Their mission, I will assume, will require them to guard the inclusive character 
of the decision-making process (Ely 1980), maintain the deliberative character 
of the decision-making process (Sunstein 1985); and ensure the equal status of 
those who take part in the democratic process (Sunstein 1994)” (Gargarella 
2010: 5).  
One of the approaches that judges could have is to call for an open discussion in order to force 
the political authorities to consider a structural problem that cause a massive violation of 
rights. In his paper on Dialogic Justice in the enforcement of Social Rights, Gargarella refers 
to the Mendoza case as one of the empirical examples of this kind of approach by the 
judiciary (Gargarella 2010: 10).  The purpose of mentioning this is neither to go profoundly 
into the debate of whether or not judges should enforce social rights, nor to make any 
normative statements. However, what is interesting is to see the role of the court in the 
Mendoza case in light of a more deliberate conception of democracy, and also to very briefly 
present the some different views on the consequences of this kind of court involvement.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
“The problem, from an analytical perspective, is that it is normally difficult to establish a 
clear causation between litigation and policy change” (Gloppen 2009: 476). The uncertainty 
regarding to what extent the observed policy changes are caused by the litigation process or 
by other parallel processes is ever greater when dealing with the more indirect policy impact 
of litigation. In order to assess the causal complexities, in-depth qualitative case studies are 
particularly useful, because the case study has the advantage of gaining in-depth knowledge 
and investigate the contextual factors that are difficult to measure in quantitative research. 
Another major strength of case studies is that they give a high conceptual validity. This gives 
the researcher the possibility “to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the 
theoretical concepts that the researcher intents to measure” (George and Bennett 2005: 19).  
 
The analytical framework indicates which process indicators I need to look for. I will 
therefore argue that the best methodological approach to answer the research question is to 
carry out an in-depth case study of the strategic litigation process in the Mendoza case, based 
on the analytical framework presented above. I will argue that a thick description and analysis 
that is closely linked to the applied analytical framework is the best approach to get a better 
understanding of policy impact of strategic litigation and the complex dynamics in the 
implementation process of a structural judgment. And thus the best approach to answer the 
research question.  
 
Although case studies are disregarded by some methodologists within political science, such 
as King, Koehane and Verba (1994), most of the empirical knowledge we have is built on 
case studies. This ambiguity is perhaps a result of the different conceptions and definitions of 
what a case study is. Gerring’s (2004) argues that “the case study method is correctly 
understood as a particular way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of 
modeling causal relations” (Gerring 2004: 341). Gerring (2004) proposes to define the case 
study as an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
(similar) units” (Gerring 2004: 342). First of all, it is therefore important to clarify what the 
Mendoza case is a case of.  
 
The case in this study is not only the lawsuit, but the entire litigation process; that includes all 
the stages in the process including voicing the claim into the legal system, the response of the 
court, the capability of the judges to find judicial remedies and finally the process of 
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implementing the judgment. Furthermore, the Mendoza case represents a new generation of 
cases, so-called “structural cases.” The three following aspects characterize a structural case: 
 
1. Cases in which a large number of persons claim that their rights have been violated, 
either voicing their claim directly or through organizations who litigation on their 
behalf 
2. Cases in which the litigants claim that several state agencies are responsible by the 
systematic failure of or lack of public policies. 
3. Cases in which the judgment orders complex remedies, and in which the judges 
instruct various public entities to undertake coordinated actions to protect the entire 
affected population (not only the litigants) 
(Garavito and Franco 2009: 3) 
The Mendoza case is a structural public interest litigation case, which, because of the 
complexity of the problem and the innovative response by the Argentine Supreme Court, is 
rather unique within an Argentinean and a global context. Although the Mendoza case is 
exceptional with regard to its scope, complexity and nature of the court’s engagement, the 
analysis of the Mendoza case can contribute to our understanding of other structural public 
interest litigation cases.  
 
Structural cases represent a new generation of public interest litigation cases in Argentina. 
Another case is the “Verbitsky case” in which the Supreme Court of the Argentine Nation 
acknowledged the structural dimensions of the prison problems (CELS 2007). In Colombia, 
there are some similar structural cases. One of them is the T-025 of 2004, on the rights of 
forcefully displaced people, and another one is T-760 of 2008, on structural reforms to the 
National Health Care system (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 1). Another example from Colombia 
is the T-153 of 1998 on living conditions of inmates within national prisons (Gargarella 2010: 
9).  The T-025 has been analyzed by César Rodríguez Garavito and Diana Rodríguez Franco 
(2009) according to the typology that was presented above. This analysis of the Mendoza case 
can be an important contribution to our understanding of the broader impact of structural 
public interest litigation, and the findings in this analysis can be used later in a comparative 
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study of the policy impact of structural public interest litigation cases.
6
 It is important to be 
aware of simultaneous processes in order to not give too much, or too little explanatory power 
to the litigation process compared to other parallel processes. It is therefore important to put 
the Mendoza case into context. The case was analysed within the context of Argentinean 
environmental policies, and scholars and participants in the process were also consulted in 
order to know the simultaneous processes of the litigation process.  
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The Mendoza case is still in progress of being implemented, and it is necessary to set a cut-off 
date for data collection. The cut-off date is 29
 
May 2010. Because the case is still in progress, 
it is too early to say if the case has been successful or not. There are also limits as to how 
much we can expect will be done with regard to implementation. Nevertheless, the first step 
of the implementation process was to undertake a policy process, and in that aspect the 
Mendoza case has had considerable direct and indirect policy impact. Environmental impact, 
impact on health and on social justice cannot be expected within such a short period of time. 
However, we can expect significant compliance and policy impact, since the court ordered the 
political authorities to initiate a policy process. 
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The data collection started during a three-week fieldwork in Buenos Aires in April/May 2009. 
A range of sources were used to investigate the link between the litigation process and 
observed policy changes, and an important part of the fieldwork was to be oriented in the 
landscape of available information, and find the most important and reliable sources. This 
included written sources such as policy documents, media coverage, public hearings, reports 
and follow-up decisions by the Quilmes court – as well as interviews with key participants in 
the litigation and policymaking process. Because the fieldwork and interviews took place at 
the very beginning of the work with this case, I had open and/or semi-structured interviews.  
Interviews were made with key actors in the litigation process, such as representatives of 
NGOs that were parties to the case. The interviews were an invaluable source in order to get 
to know the case and the process from the points of view of actors that had different roles in 
the process. The list below presents the reader with the names and positions of the informants. (
                                                
6
 There are several ongoing and forthcoming studies on the implementation of the T-760 of 2008 on structural 
reforms to the National Health Care system in Colombia, and one of them is linked to the research project on 
“Litigating the Right to Health.”  
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Table 2: List of interviews(
Name Position held Date Location  
Carolina Farstein Lawyer at Centre for Legal and 
Social Studies 
 
30.04.2009 Buenos Aires 
!"#$"%&'(#)*+$"%
,"-'$*(%
 
."/%0')#1%"2%23)%,-4#)5)%0(-#2%
(6%23)%7"2$(*%
30.04.2009 Buenos Aires 
.(-#8)9%:"9+"#;%
 
&(#5)#%(66$+)#%"2%23)%,)+#)2"#;%
(6%<*=$#(*5)*2%
 
30.04.2009 Buenos Aires 
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A#)9$8)*2%"*8%=$+)B4#)9$8)*2%(6%
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01.05.2009 Buenos Aires 
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&(#5)#%,)+#)2"#;%F)*)#"'%(6%23)%
E$=)#%:"9$*%>-23(#$2;G%>0H!>E%
 
03.05.2009 Buenos Aires 
 
A challenge in the research process is that the interview situation may influence the quality of 
data and the information. Or even more serious, that my analysis of the case has been too 
much influenced by some of my informants. We should always be critical to information by 
actors who are parts in the case, because they may have a biased view of the process or want 
to be placed in a favourable light. To counteract this I interviewed actors that had different 
roles in the implementation process. For example, interviews were made with informants 
from within the NGOs, the ACUMAR, Secretary of Environment and the Supreme Court of 
the Nation. The interview data provided me with a profound understanding of the case, and 
gave unique information about the litigation process that was not to be obtained in the 
documents studied.  
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The summaries of the judgment in the Mendoza case, publications by the Quilmes Court and 
by the Centre for Judicial Information have been central sources. The web pages of the 
Supreme Court of the Nation and Centre for Juridical Information have published several 
important documents and multimedia recourses on the litigation process (Centro de 
Información Judicial 2009c, 2009d). Secondary literature and media publications have been 
an important source of information. In the analysis of the litigation process, one of these main 
secondary sources has been a report written by lawyers at Centre for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS) who had a key role in the litigation process (Fairstein and Morales 2009). Another 
key document is “In search of a state policy for the Riachuelo River basin” (Napoli 2009) , 
reports from the Monitoring Committee (El Cuerpo Colegiado)  and newsletters published by 
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the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN) (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009; 
FARN 2010a). Also, a report published by the National Ombudsman and several NGOs in 
2003 provided essential information about the state of the river basin before the case was filed 
to court (Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación et al. 2003). A central document is the 
ACUMAR’s Integrated Plan for cleaning up the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin (PISA), along 
with secondary literature and interviews that evaluates the plan (ACUMAR 2009b). 
 
Since May 2009, all of the research for the thesis had to be done from Norway, and data and 
reports published at web pages have been the main source of information, along with e-mail 
contact with informants. In the beginning of the implementation process a wide variety of 
web pages posted information about the implementation process. These blogs and web pages 
were created by the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman’s office, NGOs, and by people in the 
legal community and activists (see the list of the most important blogs and web pages below 
this paragraph). As time has passed by, several of these blogs and web pages have no longer 
been updated regularly. The Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN) is the 
organization that has provided the most frequent and updated information in form of reports 
and newsletters about the implementation of the judgment (FARN 2010a). FARN had a 
fundamental role in analyzing the defendant’s submissions, submitting briefs and claims of 
constitutional violations (“amparos”) and maintaining coordination between the different 
organizations (FARN 2008). For that reason FARN has become one of the main sources of 
data. Both the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman have special information about the 
Mendoza case on their official web pages. The Ombudsman web page publishes reports from 
the Monitoring Committee regularly (Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación 2010). The Centre for 
Juridical Information has a Riachuelo web page that publishes summaries of the resolutions 
by the Supreme Court of the Nation and the by the Quilmes Court, the Court in charge of 
supervising the implementation of the judgment (Centro de Información Judicial 2009d). The 
Centre for Juridical Information posts the most important resolutions of the Quilmes Court 
and the Supreme Court of the Nation as short articles written in a more comprehensive 
language. This information has been essential for studying the judicial supervision of the 
implementation process. One of the orders in the Supreme Court judgment was to publish 
comprehensive information on the ACUMAR’s web page. This webpage has much 
information on the “institutional aspect,” such as meetings, publications, forums in which 
ACUMAR has participated and so on, but it lacks accurate and systematic information, and 
the reports are difficult to interpret (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009). Unfortunately then, this has 
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not been a good source of data for the analysis of the implementation of the judgment. 
However, Alejandro Rossi, former secretary general of ACUMAR, provided me with an 
understanding of ACUMARs challenges in the implementation process. Another important 
secondary source has been the news reporter Marcela Valente. Valente is an Inter Press 
Service (IPS) correspondent and part of the Tierramérica network. Tierramérica is a 
specialised news service produced by IPS with the backing of the United Nations 
Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme (Valente 2006a). 
 
Table 3: List of the most important Internet sources 
Web page Information 
Todo sobre La Corte Blog about the Supreme Court 
“Comments, contributions and reviews for a 
better Supreme Court (my translation of 
description of the blog)” 
Autoridad Cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo 
(ACUMAR) 
The official web site of the River Basin Authority 
Relatively updated, but criticised for not providing 
sufficient information 
FARN Área Riachuelo Updated information about the implementation of 
the Judgment by FARN 
Espacio-Riachuelo Web page about the Riachuelo by a Network of 
NGOs (not the same five NGOs that were third 
parts in the lawsuit) 
Not regularly updated 
Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación The National Ombudsman’s official web site 
The documents of the Monitoring Committee are 
published here 
Updated 
Centro de Información Judicial  
Especial Riachuelo 
Centre for Juridical Information’s information site 
for Riachuelo 
Updated information about resolutions by the 
Quilmes Court and the Supreme Court 
Multimedia sources about the Riachuelo 
 
 
An ethnographic study of the environmental suffering in “Villa Inflamable” (the litigants’ 
neighbourhood) by Auyero and Switstun provided me with a profound understanding of the 
more symbolic effects of the litigation process and other simultaneous processes (Auyero and 
Swistun 2009). All together, the interview data, documents and secondary sources provided 
me with a rich data material for carrying out an in-depth case study of the policy impact of the 
Mendoza case. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLLUTION PROBLEM AND CONTEXT 
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The “Mendoza case” is a public interest litigation case in Argentina regarding the polluted 
Matanza Riachuelo river basin. The pollution of the Matanza-Riachuelo is an inter-
jurisdictional problem, something that had previously been one of the main obstacles for 
forming public policies at the level of the river basin. As the map below shows, the area of the 
Matanza-Riachuelo river basin is situated within 17 jurisdictions at different levels of 
government; the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires, the Autonomous City 
of Buenos Aires and 14 municipalities (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  The mouth of the river is 
in the city of Buenos Aires, and the whole river basin is located in the province of Buenos 
Aires. A map of the river basin gives an idea of the original jurisdictional complexity of the 
problem.  
 
Map 1: Map of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin 
 
Map of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin.  
Source: Componente Cuerpo de Agua, ACUMAR, Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarollo Sustenable, 
2007 (FARN 2009b: 179). 
 
The Matanza-Riachuelo river basin appeared in 2007 on the top-thirty list of the world’s most 
polluted places (Blacksmith Institute 2007). The pollution imposes severe health risks for the 
people living near the river basin. The Matanza-Riachuelo river basin covers an area of about 
2240 km
2
 and is situated within the jurisdiction of the National Government, the Province of 
UNA POLÍTICA DE ESTADO PARA EL RIACHUELOINFORME AMBIENTAL ANUAL 2009 FARN 
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Desde el punto de vista de su comportamiento hídrico, la cuenca en 
su totalidad puede ser subdividida en tres partes: Cuenca Alta (donde 
todavía se mantienen algu as condiciones ambien ales satisfactorias), 
Cuenca Media (de características periurbana o urbana con fuertes vías 
de expansión) y la Cuenca Baja (que es una zona altamente urbanizada 
e industrial). 
Mapa 1. Cuenca Hídrica Matanza Riachuelo
Fuente: Compone te Cuerpo de Agua, ACUMAR, SAyDS, 2007
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Buenos Aires, the city of Buenos Aires and 14 municipalities. It is an area that suffers from 
multiple and complex socio-environmental problems. More than 3.5 million people live in the 
area, many of who live in extremely precarious conditions, and who are not being provided 
with basic services such as potable water, sewage system, descent housing and satisfactory 
health care. 35 per cent of the population do not have potable water and 55 per cent of the 
population do not have sewage system (Nápoli and Espil 2010: 199). Regarding the number 
of industries, the different sources operate with different numbers. ACUMAR has made a list 
of 4103 industrial establishments, but other sources of information indicate that the number of 
industries is much larger. The Economic Census from 2005 accounted for 12181 industrial 
establishments in the river basin area (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009: 15). The great variation of 
numbers witnesses that regulation of the industries has not been a priority in Argentine 
politics. The industries range from small family driven industries to large international 
companies. There are 171 waste fills in open air within the area (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009: 
26). Among the toxic liquids that are found in the Riachuelo above the permitted levels are 
arsenic, chrome, mercury and lead (Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación et al. 2003). The 
environmental damage is caused by various sources of contamination, for example industries 
with out-dated technology and lack of commitment to the current legislation, waste-fills in 
open air, and water that is flooded with sewage and toxic spills form the industries (Nápoli 
and Espil 2010: 197-200). In order to be able to carry out an analysis of the policy impact of 
the public interest litigation in the Mendoza case, we must know the institutional, political and 
economic context in which the judgment is to be implemented.  
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When the Argentinean Constitution was ratified in 1853, the Argentine Nation adopted the 
federal republican representative form of government (Constitution of the Argentine Nation 
1994; Abramovich 2009). The federal government is composed of 23 provinces and the 
autonomous city of Buenos Aires.
7
 The provinces hold all power and authority not expressly 
delegated to the national level. The provinces have their own local constitution, and have the 
right to create their own local institutions (Abramovich 2009: 54).  
 
Argentina has a tripartite separation of powers, and has an independent executive, legislative 
and judiciary. The Supreme Court of the Nation is the ultimate interpreter of the federal 
                                                
7
 The autonomy of city of Buenos Aires was recognized in the 1994 constitutional reform. 
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constitution. A declaration of unconstitutionality has only effect for the case in which it is 
pronounced. The traditional “amparo” is an instrument for the protection of individuals’ 
constitutional rights, but the constitutional amendment in 1994 included the “collective 
amparo” which enlarged the rules of standing so that it allows a member of the aggrieved 
class, NGOs and the Ombudsman’s office the right to bring cases before the courts in cases 
where there is a massive violation of constitutional rights. In the 1994 constitutional 
amendment new social rights and environmental rights were added to the constitution. Several 
international Human Rights treaties, such as the International Covenant of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), were ratified and given superior status within the 
constitutional hierarchy, and now form part of the Bill of Rights, supplementing previous 
rights. The constitutional amendments in 1994 made it possible to use new strategies to 
enforce those rights, including activism on the judicial arena (Courtis 2008: 163-167).  
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Since Argentina is a federal country, with different levels of government; National, 
Provincial, Municipal levels, and the autonomous City of Buenos Aires, there is a federal 
agency in charge of environmental policies at the federal level, but the main enforcement 
bodies are the local agencies. That means that each province could have an environmental 
agency, but it depends on the provinces and the structure of the provincial governments. Since 
they are autonomous, they can choose their own organizations. Since environmental law starts 
from the provinces, Argentina just very recently started to have federal regulations of the 
environment. Originally the provinces and the city governments were the ones establishing 
and enforcing the environmental policies. Since 1994, the new constitution gives some more 
powers to the federal government to enact general laws, and the provinces have to regulate 
these laws
8
. Article 41 of the National Constitution (amended in 1994) included the human 
right to a healthy environment and the concept of sustainable development, as well as 
minimum standards for environmental protection (DiPaola 2004; 1994).  
 
Environmental compliance requires intergovernmental and administrative coordination. There 
has been weak tradition for such coordination, but in 1990 the Environmental Federal Council 
(COFEMA) was created. COFEMA has a fundamental function regarding the coordination of 
                                                
8
 Explained by Maria Florencia Saulino, Law Clerk at the Supreme Court of the Nation in an interview 30 April 
2009. 
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environmental policies (DiPaola 2004). In 2002, the National Congress started to establish the 
minimum standards for environmental protection. The most important law within this legal 
framework is the General Environmental Law (GEL). This law includes basic environmental 
policies, goals and tools that every authority has to respect. The GEL incorporates different 
issues, such as environmental impact assessment and the right to environmental information. 
Moreover, it requires public participation on environmental decision-making process, and it 
includes a chapter on environmental damage and access to justice (DiPaola 2004).  
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Much of Argentina’s contemporary history has been characterized by political unrest and the 
change between military and civilian rule. Since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1983 
Argentina has experienced more political stability, apart from during the deep economic 
crisis/recession in 2001-2002, in which presidency changed four times in less than two weeks 
(Berg 2010). Argentina is a middle-income country in Latin-America. The 1980s was 
characterized by debt crisis, instability, economic stagnation and financial crisis. The 1990s 
were was characterized by capital flows, structural reform and economic growth (Chrisari et 
al. 1996). Despite of the economic growth and promising economic performance in the 1990s, 
the Argentine economy entered into a long recession in 1998. This recession exploded in 
1998, and in 2001 Argentina experienced its deepest economic crisis in its modern history 
(Stein and Tommasi 2008: 69). Néstor Kirchner was elected president in 2003, in the 
aftermaths of the economic crisis. Kirchner presided over four years of export-led growth, and 
Argentina’s economy grew at 9 per cent a year from 2003 to 2009 (Levitsky and Murillo 
2008: 17). Néstor Kirchner left office in 2007, and his wife, Peronist candidate Cristina 
Kirchner, won the elections in 2007. Since the 1940s, the political scene has been dominated 
by two parties, the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, or PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical 
(UCR). The Judicialist Party (PJ) and other pro-Kirchner allies also won large majorities in 
both legislative chambers, and the PJ came out in a dominant position (Levitsky and Murillo 
2008).  
 
Argentina has a relatively strong democratic record. The core institutions of democracy in 
Argentina are strong; the constitutional order has not been interrupted since Argentina’s 
return to democracy, elections are clean, civil liberties are broadly protected and the military 
has withdrawn from politics. However, the institutions of horizontal accountability are weak 
in Argentina, something that allows a higher degree of domination by the executive branch. 
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The concentration of the executive power has impinged on judicial independence, it has 
concentrated executive powers vis-à-vis the provinces, and the president has governed at the 
margins of the Congress and other institutions of horizontal accountability. Néstor Kirchner 
lead an overhaul of the Supreme Court, a Court that had been packed by President Menem in 
1990 and that was viewed as being politicized and corrupt (Levitsky and Murillo 2008). 
Although the Kirchner government improved the legitimacy of the Supreme Court when 
doing an overhaul of the Menem Supreme Court, this also to some extent continued the 
tradition of executive interference with the judiciary.  
 
Argentina is still facing serious challenges to democracy, above all the collapse of opposition 
parties and the continued weakness of the political and economic institutions. Many of the 
political and economic institutions are weak on both enforcement (the degree to which the 
rules that exist on paper are complied within practice), and stability (the degree to which 
formal rules survive minor fluctuations in the distribution of power and preferences) 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2008: 24-26). Spiller and Tommasi (2008) argue that public policies in 
Argentina are characterized by instability, and that “the deficiencies of Argentine public 
policies are the outcome of a policymaking process in which key actors have little incentive to 
cooperate with one another over time, leading to myopic political and policy choices” (Stein 
and Tommasi 2008: 109). Argentine democracy is strengthened by an extensive infrastructure 
of civil society organizations, and Argentina’s relatively good democratic record is due to the 
constraints that the society imposes on the executive power. “Argentine governments confront 
a permanent associative network for the supervision of state authorities. Civic and media 
organizations serve as agents of “societal accountability” exposing and denouncing (and thus 
raising the political cost of) state abuse” (Levitsky and Murillo 2008: 20).  
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Argentina has experienced a parallel growth of environmental rights and environmental harms 
(Wooten 2009: 20). Throughout the 1980s Argentina signed most international environmental 
treaties, but lacked the domestic mechanisms to implement them. Argentina created a national 
Secretariat of National Resources and the Human Environment in 1993, but it was removed 
by the military regime, which was in power between 1976 and 1983. The Environmental 
Secretariat was not recreated until 1991, which means that formal environmental institutions 
in Argentina are relatively new. Legislation and political awareness about environmental 
issues lag behind other countries in the region. As few other countries, Argentina has 
 44 
promoted a set of norms that aim to reach environmental protection through market 
mechanisms, mostly during the Menem administration from 1989 to 1999. Alsogaray, 
Menem’s environmental secretary, argued that: “environmental protection needed to be kept 
“profoundly coherent” with the demands of neoliberalism, including a small state role.”    
(Hochstetler 2002:41-43). The government of president la Rua promised more involvement 
by the government and a greater role of civil society, but was only two years in office. When 
President Kirchner took office in 2003, in the aftermaths of the economic crisis, economic 
growth became one of the primary goals, and he lead four years of export-led growth 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2008). Argentina has resisted tougher environmental provisions 
initiative within the MERCOSUR, the free trade agreement between Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Argentina. Fearing that Brazil’s higher environmental standards would be the 
expected standard for the whole region, Argentina has been resistant to accept environmental 
norms that might limit its development plans (Hochstetler 2002).  
 
“Despite the occasional peaks in attention, the environment, conventionally understood, has 
been far less of an issue in Argentina” (Newell and Muro 2006: 60). There is no report on 
status of environment in Argentina. NGOs are working on an initiative to make Argentina 
develope and implement Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Indicators (ECE 
indicators) in order to evaluate how legal rules are complied with and enforced (DiPaola 
2004). "Unfortunately in 200 years the environment was never a focus of the country's 
strategic decisions, and the great challenge now is making it a priority in policy-making," 
DiPaola told IPS (Valente 2010b). To sum up, the main causes of the environmental 
degradation of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin has been the lack of public policies by part 
of the political authorities with jurisdiction over the river basin, along with the absence of 
responsible environmental management of the industries that are located in the river basin 
(Nápoli in FARN 2009b: 88). 
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Article 42 of the Constitution that was amended in 1994 established the “amparo ambiental,” 
a procedural tool to assure the human right to the environment (DiPaola 2004; Constitution of 
the Argentine Nation 1994). The large enforcement gaps between constitutional rights and 
public policies, combined with a progressive Supreme Court and rules of standing that allows 
for public interest litigation, has lead to a widespread use of litigation as a strategy to hold the 
government accountable for their legal obligations. NGOs, and often networks of local, 
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national and international NGOs have mobilized on environmental issues using different 
societal accountability mechanisms.  
The civil society in Argentina is working on different issues, which have 
important influence in environmental enforcement and compliance such as, 
consensus-building projects regarding law making and implementation. In 
addition, it has an important role regarding access to information, public 
participation, and access to justice. It works on different fields, e.g. promoting 
awareness of environmental compliance and enforcement issues, training 
officials, prosecutors, and judges, participating in public hearings, developing 
environmental information in partnership with academia, and working on 
environmental administrative and judicial actions (DiPaola 2004: 2).  
However, it was an historic event that the Supreme Court of the Nation decided to take up the 
collective environmental Mendoza case.  
/$+$.?$G!,$&'*"1-(:"=-%"(+'"(&$#"(9$#(=,1"0(+-(+'"(K*3%";"(A-*%+(
The problem of Matanza-Riachuelo had been systematically excluded from the public agenda 
before the case was filed to court (Nápoli in FARN 2009b: 88). However, during the Menem 
administration, the federal government had worked on a project to clean the river, and an 
“Executive Committee of the plan for environmental management and administration of the 
Matanza-Riachuelo river basin” was set up in 1993 (Valente 2006b). This committee 
designed a plan to clean the river in 1995 (Rossi 2009). The “Executive Committee” was to 
be in charge of carrying out 12 different projects, but by April 2006 only four of them had 
been implemented. A report published by the office of the auditor general stated that the 
“Executive Committee” lacked both funding and personnel (Valente 2006b). On the other 
hand, some funding did exist, because the federal government received in the 1990s a loan of 
250 million dollars from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to clean the river. 
However, some of the money were spent on consulting, and other parts was spent on social 
plans during the economic crisis (Valente 2009; FARN 2009a). Before, the “Executive 
committee” had to negotiate over the federal budget for money to clean up the river basin, a 
big box where they had to deal with other projects, other provinces, other funds, and it was 
very difficult to track the money (Rossi 2009). Juan Carlos Villalonga of Greenpeace 
Argentina argued that, "What has been missing so far is not money [...]. The problem has 
always been the lack of political will," (Valente 2009). And, as argued by Alfredo Alberti in 
the Boca Neighbourhood Association; regarding industrial pollution it is clear that the 
problem is not the lack of money, but lack of regulation (Valente 2009). In sum, the federal 
government did have a plan to clean the river in the 1990s, but the plan had failed partly 
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because of lack of political will and adequate institutions to implement the plan (Valente 
2006b). 
 
Before the case was filed to court, there was no epidemiologic study that verified the 
connection between health damages suffered by the people and the contamination in the river 
basin. An ethnographic study carried out by Javier Auyero and Débora A. Swistun (2009) in 
“Villa Inflamable,” a shantytown located near the Petrochemical Pole Dock Sud in the 
Riachelo,  questioned how so many Argentineans could live under toxic conditions for so 
long. The Auditor General of the Nation published a study of the state of the river, calling 
attention of the risk of a "health catastrophe," and the national Ombudsman's Office called for 
public policies to clean the river and improve environmental health (Valente 2006a; Defensor 
del Pueblo de la Nación et al. 2003). 
In spite of this, this problem has been systematically excluded from the 
public agenda, locked in a tangle of jurisdictions, the demarcation of 
responsibilities between the competent authorities and an inconsistent 
regulatory framework that made them never cope with the conflicts that 
caused this to happen in an integrated way (Nápoli and Espil 2010: 199-
200).  
Not until the Supreme Court intervened the responsible authorities would start to work out 
public policies aiming to improve the environmental situation of the river basin. (Nápoli and 
Espil 2010: 197-200).! 
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CHAPTER 5: THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN THE MENDOZA CASE 
First of all, in order to analyze how the litigation process has influenced public policies 
regarding the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, it is important to make a systematic overview of 
the litigation process. This is a process that has evolved during almost 6 years, from Beatriz 
Mendoza and others filed the case to the Supreme Court in 2004 until the cut-off date for data 
collection that is 29
 
May 2010. The litigation process involves several stages; voicing the 
claim into the legal system, the order by the court to design a plan to clean up the river basin, 
the Supreme Court’s decision to include third parts, the creation of a river basin authority, the 
presentation of the first plan, the process of public hearings in which the plan was evaluated, 
the final judgement by the Supreme Court, and the implementation of the judgement (Centro 
de Información Judicial 2009e). 
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At this stage we analyze how the litigants in the Mendoza case were able to voice their claims 
into the legal system. Litigation was not the only strategy within their political opportunity 
structure. NGOs, the Ombudsman’s Office and residents in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin 
had tried to influence the political authorities to take action to clean the river through other 
strategies before the case was filed to the Supreme Court. However, according to a study by 
Ryan (2009), the social actors (those affected by the environmental contamination) had 
formal access to policy makers, but their claims did not considerably affect the policy debate. 
Also, the level of organized collective action was low (Ryan 2009: 22-26).  
 
It is very interesting to analyze how the voices of the marginalized people were voiced into 
the legal system. The case was filed by residents in “Villa Inflamable,” one of the most 
polluted shantytowns in the river basin. According to Auyero and Switstun, a sociologist and 
an anthropologist doing field research in Villa Inflamable at this time, there was actually a 
collective disbelief in collective action in Villa Inflamable when the case was brought to the 
Supreme Court (Auyero and Swistun 2009). Beatriz Mendoza and other neighbours filed the 
case with the assistance of a private law firm, not NGOs (Farstein 2010). Lawyers had some 
years ago started entering Villa Inflamable, and residents started placing hopes in future legal 
compensation for toxic damage (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 19).  
 
Auyero and Switstun claim that the beliefs and conceptions that the residents of Villa 
Inflamable had about the contamination of their neighbourhood to a large extent were formed 
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by the presence of lawyers and doctors that came and left the shantytown every now and then. 
The residents also heard rumours about re-localization and the possibilities of re- localization 
funds. The lawyers that brought the case to the Supreme Court together with and behalf of 
Beatriz Mendoza and other neighbours in Villa Inflamable held the National Government, the 
Province of Buenos Aires, the City of Buenos Aires and 44 companies legally responsible for 
the health damages caused by the contamination. They exercised “their personal rights in their 
capacity as victims of the environmental contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, 
with some of them also exercising the rights of their minor children” (Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 
1). They were claiming for a compensation fund for the health damages.
9
 However, the 
residents did not agree on what remedy they would ask for, and many of them were afraid that 
they would have to be re-located and loose their homes. Despite disagreement and the 
“collective disbelief in joint action” among the residents of Villa Inflamable, the case was 
brought to the Supreme Court in 2004 by some of the residents (Auyero and Swistun 2009).  
 
Parallel to this, the Boca Neighbourhood Association and the coalition of NGOs and the 
Ombudsman’s Office were publishing reports about the state of the River Basin. CELS, for 
example, did not know about the case before the Supreme Court decided to hear the case and 
called for public hearings, but even if they would have known about the lawsuit earlier, they 
could not have applied to be third parties to the case before the Supreme Court had accepted 
the case. When the Supreme Court accepted the case the NGOs did in a way anticipate the 
possibility to participate as third parties, “because the Environmental National Law envisages 
the possibility of third parties to join cases where the collective right to the environment 
is affected” (Farstein 2010). The rules of standing in Article 43 of the National Constitution 
allow public interest litigation if constitutional rights and guarantees are violated, including 
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 “The lawsuit sought liability from: The National Government for allowing the denounced situation to 
occur in a navigable and inter-jurisdictional waterway, over which it is empowered to regulate and 
control, according to Article 74, paragraphs 10 and 13 of National Constitution. The Province of Buenos 
Aires for having original dominion over the natural resources within its territory, as established by 
articles 121 and 124 of the Fundamental Law. The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in its capacity as 
proprietor of the Riachuelo River, which constitutes a public domain resource within its jurisdiction. 
The City is obligated to equitably and reasonably use its waters and other river resources, along with the 
riverbed and its subsoil, without causing appreciable harm to the river’s other proprietors. These 
obligations are a result of the city’s jurisdiction over its coastal islands, within the scope of the Rio de la 
Plata treaty, and because Article 81 of the local Constitution mandates the preservation of the flora and 
fauna within the river’s ecosystem. 44 adjacent businesses for having dumped hazardous waste directly 
into the river, for failing to constructed waste treatment plants, for failing to adopt new technologies, 
and for failing to minimize the risks of their activities” (FARN 2008). 
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rights protecting the environment.
10
 This enables marginalized people to overcome the 
practical barriers to voicing their claims into the legal system.  
 
The Boca Neighbourhood Association (la Boca is a part of Buenos Aires that suffers from the 
contamination of the river basin) had turned to the City Ombudsman’s Office to seek 
protection for their right to live in a healthy environment. The City Ombudsman’s Office 
received them and helped them, and after that they went to the National Ombudsman’s Office, 
which also helped them. The Ombudsman’s Office and several NGOs (not only the NGOs 
that were later accepted as third parts to the lawsuit) published a report and a follow-up report 
on the critical situation in the river basin. “We started to work together with the City 
Ombudsman and the National Ombudsman and some NGOs. From there we walked a long 
road, and we finally arrived at the Supreme Court (my translation),” said Alfredo Alberti and 
Cristina Fins in the Boca Neighborhood Association in an interview.  
 
First, Beatriz Mendoza and others filed the case to the Supreme Court. After the court issued 
its first sentence, in which it decided to take up the collective case, the Ombudsman and 
several NGOs were claiming to be accepted as third parts to the case. It was important for the 
NGOs who were working on the problems of the pollution of the Matanza-Riachuelo river 
basin to be included as third parts, because they believed that once the court accepted the 
case, the future of the river basin would be determined by the outcome in court, and therefore 
it was important that their views on the case were included in the process, Farstein said in an 
interview in 2009. Several NGOs applied to be included. However, only five were accepted. 
That means that some NGOs that had been working together with the National Ombudsman’s 
office on the Matanza-Riachuelo problem earlier were not accepted as third parts, and were 
therefore not able to voice their claims into the legal system. When the Supreme Court had 
accepted the case, the judiciary became the main institutional arena where the policy debate 
took place (Ryan 2009: 19).  
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 Section 43 of the Argentine constitution states that “Any person shall file a prompt and summary proceeding 
regarding constitutional guarantees, provided there is no other legal remedy, against any act or omission of the 
public authorities or individuals which currently or imminently may damage, limit, modify or threaten rights and 
guarantees recognized by this Constitution, treaties or laws, with open arbitrariness or illegality. In such case, the 
judge may declare that the act or omission is based on an unconstitutional rule. This summary proceeding against 
any form of discrimination and about rights protecting the environment, competition, users and consumers, as 
well as about rights of general public interest, shall be filed by the damaged party, the ombudsman and the 
associations which foster such ends registered according to a law determining their requirements and 
organization forms” (1994). 
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The mobilization and associative capacity of the different litigators made it possible for them 
to join their forces to mobilize collectively. This is an important factor in the strength and 
quality of voice. The working together of the NGOs in the process was good according to the 
people I interviewed. However, their views or emphasis on what was most important and 
urgent varied. For example, The Boca Neighbourhood Association had more immediate 
concerns than some of the other NGOs, because they live near the river basin. Nonetheless, 
they considered the cooperation between the NGOs as good, Alberti and Fins said in an 
interview. The courts’ responsiveness to the claims voiced by the litigants and the NGOs is 
very interesting and decisive for the future development of process.  
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The output indicator for the courts’ responsiveness is the extent to which the court is 
responsive to the claims that were voiced, and accepted them as “legitimate matters for the 
court to decide” (Gloppen 2006: 49). The outcome on public policies is to a large extent 
dependent on the response of the Supreme Court to the claims presented to them. In this case 
the Court broke with former precedent (Nápoli in FARN 2009b: 88). The response was rather 
unique and innovative, and could be seen as a result of the need to the judiciary to restore its 
legitimacy. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the individual claims concerning a compensation fund, saying 
that they had to go to the district courts, because the Supreme Court did not consider these 
claims as being under their original jurisdiction. However, in its first judgement, on 20 June 
2006, the Supreme Court accepted the collective environmental case that addressed the 
pollution of inter-jurisdictional resources, and recognized its power to protect the “general 
interest” (Lorenzetti et al. 2008). ”In an historical event people who felt isolated and 
marginalized filed a case to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court decided to take up the 
collective environmental case” (Lorenzetti in Centro de Información Judicial 2009c).  
 
Upon accepting the case, the Supreme Court referred to Article 117 of the National 
Constitution, Article 41 and 43 of the Fundamental Law, Article 30 of Law 25.675 and 
Article 28 of Law 25.675 (Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 1). Article 41 of the National Constitution 
declares that: “All inhabitants are entitled to the right to a healthy and balanced environment 
[…] The authorities shall provide for the protection of this right” (Constitution of the 
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Argentine Nation 1994). Furthermore, in its judgement on 20 June, 2006, the Supreme Court 
requested information from the defendant-businesses, ordered the National Government, the 
Province of Buenos Aires, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the Federal 
Environmental Council (COFEMA) to present an integrated plan for cleaning the river. They 
also called for a public hearing in front of the Supreme Court, and ordered the litigants to add 
up-to-date information, and to clarify their claim (Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 2).  
 
The Ombudsman of the Nation submitted a request to intervene in the case. This request was 
first dismissed, but on 24 August 2006 the Supreme Court accepted the Ombudsman as third 
part to the case, based on the terms of Article 90 of the Civil and Commercial Procedural 
Code of the Nation (Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 2). The NGOs that were accepted as third parts 
were The Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), Centre for Legal and 
Social Studies (CELS), The Boca Neighbourhood Association, Greenpeace Argentina and 
The Citizen Association for Human Rights (ACDH). The NGOs were accepted because the 
Supreme Court considered the interests of these NGOs, as found in their statures, to be 
legitimate “in the preservation of a collective right such as the right to a healthy environment” 
(Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 3). After the inclusion of the fifth NGO, measures were taken by the 
court to limit the number of third parts in order to not delay the process (Lorenzetti et al. 
2008). In their presentations to the court, the NGOs made references to international human 
rights norms. They claimed that the pollution of the river basin had lead to a range of human 
rights violations, such as violations of the right to health, water, housing rights, and the right 
to a clean environment (Fairstein and Morales 2009: 334-335).  
 
The Supreme Court ordered a series of public hearings in which all the parts in the lawsuit got 
the chance to present their view. In the first round of public hearings in September 2006, the 
responsible authorities presented an Integrated Plan on how to clean-up the river basin (PISA) 
and they presented the river basin committee (ACUMAR). In the second public hearing in 
February 2007 the Secretary of Environment informed about the progress since the plan was 
presented. In the third round of public hearings in June 2007 the relevant parties expressed 
their opinions on the PISA. All the parts in the lawsuit and independent experts from the 
University of Buenos Aires got the possibility to make comments on the plan. In the fourth 
round of public hearings in November 2007 the 61 defendants replied to the initial claim. On 
8 July 2008 the Supreme Court handed down its landmark Judgment (Centro de Información 
Judicial 2009e).  
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The process from when the Supreme Court accepted the case in June 2006 until it handed 
down its Judgement in July 2008 could be described as a dialogic or deliberate process. Along 
with the lines of a deliberative conception of democracy the political authorities were forced 
to make their decisions after an ample process of collective discussion, including the 
participation of (representatives from) everyone potentially affected by the decision. 
According to Gargarella, it is not anymore uncommon in the region that the courts order 
public hearings (Gargarella 2010). Further on in the analysis the response of the Supreme 
Court in the Mendoza case will be discussed in more detail. But first we move on to the next 
stage in the litigation process, namely the judge’s capability to find suitable remedies for the 
violations of rights.   
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The outcome indicator at this stage is the extent to which the legal claims that were accepted 
by the court resulted in transformative rulings – judgements that lead to changes in policies. 
The capability of finding remedies depends on both substantial law and on judges’ ability to 
find remedies to repair the rights violations. After the public hearings the court started 
working on finding solutions to solve the problem.  
 
The judges had a range of jurisprudential material to assist them in dealing with the case. First 
of all they had significant in-house expertise. Lorenzetti, the president of the Supreme Court 
at the time when the Mendoza case was adjudicated, published in 2008 a book on the theory 
of environmental law including a jurisprudential appendix on environmental lawsuits (the first 
resolutions by the Supreme Court in the Mendoza case were included in the jurisprudential 
appendix). Although the response by the Supreme Court was rather innovative compared to 
the cases presented in the book, the process of writing the book is likely to have influenced 
the capability of the court president and the court to find effective judicial remedies, and made 
the court more sensitive to environmental issues. According to Farstein, the NGOs made 
reference to the structural judgment on the rights of the internally displaced people in 
Colombia (Farstein 2009, personal interview). This could possibly have affected the judges to 
take on a similar road as the structural judgment issued by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court. 
 
The court did not make the Integrated Plan to clean the river basin – the court ordered a plan 
to be made by the defendant states. This is important, because the court did not create the 
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public policies and therefore did not themselves directly order specific legal remedies. The 
court recognized that rights had been violated and that actions had to be made to restore the 
environmental damage. It is important to not misunderstand this issue. However, measures 
taken by the court influenced the content of the plan. First of all, the court gave very short 
time limits for presenting a plan. The court ordered a series of public hearings in which the 
plan was to be presented and discussed. The court decided whom to include in the process of 
public hearings in which the plan was to be evaluated. Therefore the judges’ did to a certain 
extent influence the outcome of the plan (and thus the legal remedies to the pollution 
problem) in the frames they made for the formation of the plan. In its judgement on 8 July 
2008, the Supreme Court criticised the Integrated Plan and ordered that it had to be improved. 
In its final judgment the Supreme Court put emphasis in that the political authorities had to 
comply effectively with what they had promised regarding the prevention and re-composition 
of the environmental damage (Lorenzetti in Centro de Información Judicial 2009c).  
 
In its landmark judgment on 8 July 2008, the Supreme Court acknowledged the legal 
responsibility of the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of 
Buenos Aires to improve the quality of life for the inhabitants of the Matanza-Riachuelo river 
basin, and to clean up and prevent future environmental damage in the river basin. Achieving 
the objectives of the judgement require specific actions to be taken. The areas in which the 
court demanded action to be taken were:  
• Public information  
• Industrial pollution 
• Clean-up of landfills 
• Cleaning the riverbanks 
• Expansion of the potable water network 
• Storm drainage 
• Sewage sanitation 
• Emergency health plan 
(Lorenzetti et al. 2008)  
 
The judgment stated that the most important regarding the environment is the concrete 
implementation of public policies (Lorenzetti in Centro de Información Judicial 2009c). The 
Supreme Court ordered the ACUMAR to be in charge of implementing the specific public 
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policies for cleaning up the contaminated Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, without taking away 
the responsibilities that primarily correspond to the National Government, the Province of 
Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires. 
 
Another very important element of the judgment is the control with the implementation of the 
plan. The implementing authorities have to give broad information that is publicly accessible 
and that it is possible for any citizen to verify. Moreover, the Ombudsman and the NGOs that 
had intervened in the case should form a monitoring committee to control the implementation. 
The General Audit of the nation should be in charge of controlling the economic aspects. 
Furthermore, judicial control with the implementation was delegated to a federal judge of the 
Quilmes Court. The Supreme Court also retained sole jurisdiction of the case, ordering that no 
other court could intervene (Lorenzetti et al. 2008). “We hope that in this way, it will be 
controlled and that a new phase of implementation will start, accompanied with a broad 
public participation” (Lorenzetti in Centro de Información Judicial 2009c). 
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The Judgement has to a limited extent been complied with, and in order to understand why, 
we must carefully describe the dynamics in the implementation process of the judgement. It is 
important to distinguish between the first Judgement in June 2006, in which the Supreme 
Court accepted the case and ordered the responsible authorities to present an Integrated Plan 
to Clean up the river, and the Judgement in July 2008, in which the court ordered the 
implementation of a program for specific public policies in order to clean the river, prevent 
future environmental harm and improve the lives of the inhabitants of the river basin. The 
process in between, including a series of court ordered public hearings, could be described as 
a dialogic or deliberative process in which all involved parts got the chance to present their 
view. In 2010, the Supreme Court has issued two more follow-up judgements, showing that 
the court has not abandoned the case and is still present in the implementation process (Centro 
de Información Judicial 2010c, 2010a). In order to assess the policy impact of the Mendoza 
case, it is necessary to describe the implementation process in a chronological manner.   
 
In search for public policies for the river basin 
The federal government worked on making a project to clean up the river in 1995, however 
this project was never completed (Rossi 2009). From the point of view of Alejandro Rossi, 
former secretary general of ACUMAR, there is no doubt that the litigation process by the 
 55 
NGOs was one of the key reasons to move forward a public policy regarding the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin (Rossi 2009). According to him, this view is accepted by most people 
working in the public sector, the private sector and civil society working on the topic of 
Matanza-Riachuelo.  
 
Again, it is important to remember is that the Supreme Court did not make the public policies 
on the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, but it ordered the political authorities to do so. Because 
of the institutional fragmentation in the inter-jurisdictional river basin, there was the need to 
form a strong inter-jurisdictional river basin authority, and therefore the Federal Government, 
the Province of Buenos Aires and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires decided to form an 
inter-jurisdictional river basin authority, the ACUMAR (Rossi, personal interview 2009).  
 
The River Basin Committee (ACUMAR) 
The ACUMAR, the river-basin authority, is an inter-jurisdictional entity created by National 
Law 26.168 in December 2006, and approved by the Province of Buenos Aires through Law 
Number 13.642, and by the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires through law Number 2.217. 
The responsible political authorities created the ACUMAR as a response to the order by 
Supreme Court in 2006. The ACUMAR was to be in charge of the making and 
implementation of the Integrated Plan for clean-up of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. The 
ACUMAR consists of a Directive Council/Board chaired by the Secretary of Environment 
and Sustainable Development and representatives from the three jurisdictions, a Municipal 
Council/Board with representatives from the 14 municipalities that constitute the river basin, 
and a Commission for Social Participation, which is meant to give room for civil society to 
articulate their view on the Plan. Also, a Forum of Universities on the Matanza-Riachuelo 
(FACUMAR) was formed to create interaction between the Universities carrying out 
investigations on the Matanza-Riachuelo and a group of experts responsible for carrying out 
the plan. The river-basin authority also consists of a Executive Management (Dirección 
Ejecutiva) and a General Secretariat that unites all the actors that shape the Integrated Plan for 
the Clean Up of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin (ACUMAR 2009a; El Cuerpo Colegiado 
2009).  
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The responsible authorities presented the ACUMAR and a Clean-Up-Plan for Matanza-
Riachuelo on the first round of public hearings in September 2006 (El Cuerpo Colegiado 
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2009; Centro de Información Judicial 2009e). An interview with Rossi gave central insight 
into the process in which the plan to clean the river basin was made. This is important in order 
to understand the further difficulties in the implementation process of the judgement. 
However, it is also important to remember that a person that holds an important position may 
have a biased view of the process or want to be placed in a favourable light. 
 
The Supreme Court gave short deadlines to make a plan to clean the river basin. The plan that 
was presented had to be developed “in 40 days or something” said Rossi. This is, according to 
him, why the plan from the beginning was far from perfect and not very consistent. As noted 
earlier, the public administration had worked on a project of cleaning the Matanza-Riachuelo 
river basin in the 1990s, under the Menem administration. When the new river basin 
authority, the ACUMAR, had to make an integrated plan for how to solve the pollution 
problem of Matanza-Riachuelo within the short deadline set by the Supreme Court, they “only 
took the boxes of papers that were already there, made some cosmetic changes and presented 
it to the Supreme Court just to see what would happen” said Rossi, who worked at the project 
at that time.  
 
The Integrated Plan for Clean Up of the river basin, approved by the Resolution ACUMAR 
Number 8/2007, consists of actions aimed at protect and clean up the river basin (ACUMAR 
2009b). However, according to Rossi the document is actually an executive summary of the 
plan for Matanza-Riachuelo – and in fact it is a summary of something that does not exist, 
because there was never a proper plan. There were several presentations for the Supreme 
Court, but a document called “Plan for Matanza-Riachuelo” was never approved, not by the 
authority and not by the legislative power. Only the executive summary was approved by the 
ACUMAR. According to Rossi, there was never a proper plan, because there was not enough 
time to make a clearly stated plan. At that point, everybody thought that the best idea would 
be to just start to work on the issues. The Integral Plan is full of inconsistencies, “because it 
was just a piece of work to show the court that something was going on,” Rossi said (Rossi 
2009, personal interview). 
 
The Court decided to get involved with the supervision of the plan, and to let the Ombudsman 
and the NGOs, that were accepted as third parts to the case, to be involved in the evaluation, 
supervision and implementation of the plan. The plan on how to solve the pollution problem 
of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin was then discussed and evaluated in several public 
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hearings, in which independent experts from the University of Buenos Aires also were 
involved (Centro de Información Judicial 2009c). The litigation process therefore also 
changed the way that public policies on the Matanza-Riachuelo were made, in that the process 
that lead up to the final judgement in the Mendoza case to a large extent could be described as 
more of a deliberative process. 
 
In its judgment in July 2008 the Supreme Court set deadlines and ordered the responsible 
authorities to implement a program of specific public policies (Centro de Información Judicial 
2009c). The Integral Plan that existed at that point was criticised in the judgement for not 
being clear and consistent enough (Lorenzetti et al. 2008). On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court did in some way approve the Integral Plan when it determined that the administration 
should follow certain time limits for each of the actions it the program of public policies that 
the ACUMAR was ordered to implement. The program of public policies that was ordered by 
the court in the final judgement was extensive in terms of what had to be done to comply with 
the judgement, but it left much room for the relevant authorities to design the specific public 
policies. 
 
Since the Judgement in July 2008, the ACUMAR has been working on modifying the Integral 
Plan, due to the response from the monitoring committee and judge Armella at the Quilmes 
Court. On several occasions since the Judgement in July 2008 the ACUMAR has presented 
reports with little or no reference to specific and concrete actions regarding the various 
components of the program. Therefore, judge Armella at the Quilmes Court ordered on 1 
October 2009 integrated projects and time lines of work and actions that were detailed for the 
different components of the program by 31 December 2009 (FARN 2009e). As a response to 
this order, the ACUMAR presented on 1 February 2010 a new Integrated Plan for how to 
comply with the judgement. This plan came three years after the presentation of the first plan, 
very delayed. During these three years the ACUMAR has worked on the basis of the 
executive summary, a summary of a text that was never approved.  All though the plan 
presented February 1
st
 came late, it is considered very positive that this new Integrated Plan 
was finally presented (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
The new Integrated Plan to clean the river basin 
The new plan has some changes in its organizational structure, in the diagramming of the 
operatives and in the financing. The lines of action in the Plan also assign an active 
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participation of the municipalities situated in the river basin (ACUMAR 2010). Some of the 
preliminary observations of the new Integrated Plan are that it is a collection of documents 
that are not seemingly interrelated in an integrated way, and that the expressions are mostly 
vague and ambiguous. It is still unclear how and when inspections of the industries should be 
carried out, the estimated costs of the activities are not specified and coherent with the budget 
approved by the national congress, and the new Integrated Plan further postpone the actions 
ordered by the Court. Other preoccupations concerning the new Integrated Plan is the 
recurrent refusal by ACUMAR to arbitrate mechanisms for citizen participation (Nápoli and 
Espil 2010: 237-238). Because only preliminary evaluations of the new plan existed at the 
cut-off date for data collection, compliance with the judgement in this analysis is not based on 
the new plan.  
 
The new plan presented in February 2010 is more than 5000 pages (ACUMAR 2010).  When 
reports are presented in such an extensive format, the evaluation process by the Quilmes 
Court and the Chartered Body takes time. That could be one of the reasons why the Supreme 
Court on 6 April 2010 issued a new Judgement in which it ordered the National Government, 
the Province of Buenos Aires, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and ACUMAR to 
present a study of the upright and exact compliance with all the mandates given by the 
judgement within 15 days (Centro de Información Judicial 2010b). The resolution by the 
Supreme Court in April 2010 shows a clear commitment on the part of the Supreme Court 
with regard to ensuring compliance with the judgement.  
 
Official Enforcement Mechanisms 
The existence of official enforcement mechanisms is believed to have a positive impact on 
compliance. The Supreme Court included in its final sentence a range of supervisory orders. 
The General Audit was ordered to supervise the economic aspects, a federal judge of the 
Quilmes Court was to be in charge of judicial control of the implementation of the judgement, 
and a monitoring committee (“El Cuerpo Colegiado”) was to be in charge of monitoring 
compliance. The Judgement also gave the Quilmes Court the authority to impose fines on the 
ACUMAR if the Judgement was not complied with (Lorenzetti et al. 2008).  
 
Armella, the federal judge in charge of exercising judicial control with the judgement, has 
imposed a series on enforcement mechanisms in order to make the ACUMAR take action to 
comply with the judgement. Among the enforcement mechanisms are: demanding ACUMAR 
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to present reports on progress, imposing fines on public officials for non-compliance with the 
judgement, ordering the institutional strengthening of the ACUMAR and ordering the 
intervention by the police to assist the ACUMAR in the work to implement the judgement 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2009l, 2009m, 2009f, 2009b, 2009k). The monitoring 
committee follows up and frequently reports on the (lack of) compliance with the judgement. 
All though the judgement in the Mendoza case only to a limited extent has been complied 
with, the use of formal enforcement mechanisms seem to have had a positive impact on 
compliance, and makes it impossible for the responsible authorities to abandon the obligations 
they have according to the judgement.  
 
FARN states that Judge Armella at the Quilmes Court has showed that he has been committed 
to secure compliance with the judgement. The interventions by the Quilmes court have been 
crucial in order to push for an integral planning of actions for the Matanza-Riachuelo river 
basin, for the institutional strengthening of the ACUMAR, for the assignment of funds and 
budget for the inter-jurisdictional body by part of the responsible authorities, for the start of 
works on infrastructure and for improving the access to public information (Nápoli and Espil 
2010: 211). Comparing the dates of orders by the Quilmes Court and reports from the 
monitoring committee to the dates of actions taken by the ACUMAR seem to suggest that the 
official enforcement mechanisms have had an important role in securing compliance with the 
terms of the judgement.  
 
In addition to the Quilmes Court and the monitoring committee, the Supreme Court is still 
issuing follow-up judgements, such as the judgement on 6
 
April when it ordered the 
ACUMAR to present a report on concrete advances in the implementation of the judgement, 
and on 27 May when it declared that it considered the report by the ACUMAR to be 
insufficient and ordered the responsible authorities to submit a new report within three days 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2010b, 2010c). “Through this new resolution the Supreme 
Court has sent a clear message to all the authorities and actors involved in the Mendoza case, 
reaffirmed its presence in the topic and manifested its interest in that the sentence should be 
effectively complied with (my translation)” (Di Paola in FARN 2010b). 
 
An important obstacle for judicial and citizen control with implementation of the judgement is 
the lack of an appropriate measurement system to evaluate achievements of the work to clean 
the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. In October 2009 judge Armella at the Quilmes Court 
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ordered the ACUMAR to intensify its actions to implement an international measurement 
system in order to be able to evaluate the achievements in the clean-up of the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin (Centro de Información Judicial 2009g). In December 2009 this had still 
not been implemented, making judicial and societal control with implementation of the 
judgement difficult. 
 
The political authorities in charge of implementing the judgement 
Voluntary compliance is influenced by the institutional capacity of the authorities that are in 
charge of implementing the judgement. We must first identify who are the authorities 
responsible for implementing the judgement, and to determine their scope of authority, and 
discuss the actual scope of the implementing authorities, and its financial, institutional and 
administrative resources (Gloppen 2008a). The ACUMAR is, according to the judgement, the 
authority in charge of designing and implementing a program for specific public policies for 
cleaning the river (Lorenzetti et al. 2008). In cases in which there is a conflict in interests, the 
ACUMAR should have the last say. However, the judgement also says that ACUMAR should 
not harm the capability of the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires, and the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires to be in charge of the responsibility that primarily 
correspond to them depending on the territorial settlement of the basin and their 
environmental obligations in the National Constitution (Centro de Información Judicial 2008).  
 
In the process of implementing the judgement the ACUMAR has not showed to have the 
sufficient inter-jurisdictional power necessary to solve the problem of the Matanza-Riachuelo 
river basin (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009). Judge Armella at the Quilmes Court has highlighted 
the importance of the institutional strengthening of the ACUMAR, saying that “we have to 
make it independent form the political conjunctures” (Centro de Información Judicial 2009j). 
In the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin there is a need to balance the political forces within the 
different jurisdiction in order to be able to agree on a public policy on the level of the river 
basin (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
The institutional weakness of the ACUMAR is one of the main reasons for why the 
judgement has not been complied with, according to the monitoring committee, the NGOs 
and judge Armella at the Quilmes court. Judge Armella has several times ordered the 
institutional strengthening of the ACUMAR. In mid-October Armella observed some 
advancements in the structure of the ACUMAR, in that ACUMAR was being specified with 
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regard to structure, the definition of seats, and the creation of permanent committees in 
ACUMAR. Improvements were also made regarding integration of technical expertise 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2009h). Still, even in the last evaluation by the monitoring 
committee, after these advancements in the structuring of the ACUMAR, they conclude that 
the ACUMAR has serious weaknesses in order to become the superior authority and obtain 
the main role in formulating policies at the level of the river basin (El Cuerpo Colegiado 
2009). The ACUMAR was created by the relevant political authorities through changes in 
legislation. The Quilmes Court and FARN have rather recommended the signing of an inter-
jurisdictional treaty in accordance with the Article 124 of the National Constitution (Nápoli 
and Espil 2010: 207). Another problem is the permanent changes within the ACUMAR. 
Within the past one and a half year, the Executive director has been changed four times, and 
the president has changed two times. There have been constant changes of officials, and since 
it was created the structure has been modified four times. This has affected its functioning and 
generated a permanent discontinuity in its actions (Nápoli and Espil 2010: 208).  
 
The limited scope of authority is closely linked to the lack of resources. Funds and a budget 
for carrying out the actions to comply with the judgement has been assigned by the 
responsible authorities, partly thanks to resolutions by the Quilmes court (Nápoli and Espil 
2010: 211-214). The federal government received a World Bank loan of 840 million USD to 
finance some of the large projects on infrastructure in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2009i). The role of the companies in financing the project to 
clean the river is an unresolved issue, and the companies are waiting for a new resolution by 
the Supreme Court. Nobody wants to hear about ACUMAR’s powers to create any kind of 
tax, such as polluter pay tax, which would be a way of giving independence to the authority, 
said Rossi. The lack of resources within the ACUMAR also involves human resources, 
logistic resources and administrative resources (Rossi, personal interview 2009). Voluntary 
compliance is, as the analytical framework suggests, dependent on the amount of resources 
available for the authorities in charge of implementing the judgement. 
 
The role of the Municipalities 
The reality of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin is depending on the decisions that the local 
territories take every day. The municipalities have a great responsibility regarding municipal 
hospitals, waste management, localization of industries and productive activities, the urban 
undertakings, to show some (FARN 2009d). However, the municipalities were not included 
 62 
as the responsible authorities in the final judgement by the Supreme Court. The municipalities 
only have a consultancy role within the ACUMAR, but the implementation of the judgement 
is dependent on the compliance of the municipalities. However, Luis Armella, the federal 
judge of the Quilmes Court, decided to impose fines for non-compliance not only on the 
president of the ACUMAR, but also on the mayor of the municipality of Lanús. FARN sees it 
as favourable that the fines do not only fall on the president of the ACUMAR, something that 
manifests that the clean-up of the Matanza-Riachuelo involves the compliance of all the 
authorities in the area (FARN 2009c). From FARN’s point of view there is a necessity to 
involve the municipalities more in the Plan to clean up the river basin, showing the 
commitment that the local authorities should have in their respective territory, and that in one 
way or another, they have an impact on the clean-up of the river basin (FARN 2009c). 
According to FARN, the National Government dominates the management of the ACUMAR, 
and the municipal authorities do not play an important role within the inter-jurisdictional river 
basin authority. According to the ACUMAR, the new Integrated Plan assigns an active 
participation of the municipalities in the river basin. However, they still only have a 
consultative role within the river basin authority. 
 
Actors seeking to influence the implementation process 
What the framework suggests to do is to identify the external actors who may seek to 
influence the implementation process, i.e. the political opposition, activists, industry lobbyists 
etc (Gloppen 2008a). This is because it is important to try to understand who has an interest in 
that the judgement is being implemented or that it is not being implemented, and who may 
use the judgement as a way of seeking to change policies (Gloppen 2008a).  
 
Activists, NGOs and the National Ombudsman’s Office seek to influence the implementation 
process in the Mendoza case, and they have an interest in that the judgement is complied with. 
They use both official and unofficial enforcement mechanisms to put pressure on the 
implementing authorities. Examples of out-of-court mobilization strategies by the NGOs are 
media reports and Greenpeace demonstrations in the river basin area. The NGOs and the 
Ombudsman’s Office also publish frequent reports about the state of the river basin, and they 
frequently update information about Riachuelo and the implementation process on their 
websites. Several actors also post information on various blogs. However, as Alfredo Alberti 
and Cristina Fins in the Boca Neighborhood Organization said in an interview “We always 
work very formally with the institutions. But the corruption is through the informal channels. 
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Informal channels are very powerful, because our government is very corrupt. How can we 
correct or penetrate the informal sector? (my translation)” (Alfredo Alberti and Cristina Fins  
2009, personal interview). 
 
Actors who are not in favour of the judgement may also seek to influence the implementation 
process through the informal sector. Corruption is a serious obstacle to compliance with the 
judgment. A very interesting point made by Rossi is that it is very difficult to clean these 
areas because the municipalities don’t want to do it. The problem is not that they don’t care 
about the environment. They care about the environment and they would like to have a green 
policy. The problem is, according to Rossi, that 
Mainly they need funds, and the only way to get those funds is to get involved 
with the system of corruption in some way. So what I am very roughly trying to 
show you is that even though politicians would have liked to have a correct 
policy, to clean up and to solve the Matanza-Riachualo problems - in the reality 
there are several issues that obstruct the politicians from solving the pollution 
problem (Rossi, personal interview 2009). 
One of the main sources of contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin is the 
industrial pollution. Beatriz Mendoza and the other litigators originally filed the case against 
the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires and 44 
companies. The Supreme Court suggested a judicial remedy that involved inspections and 
regulations of all the industries in the river basin (Lorenzetti et al. 2008). The Quilmes Court 
has also called for the need to focus more on the control of the industries, one of the pillars in 
the work to clean up the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, but on this issue they must work hard 
to break with many obligations and a culture that has been there for many years (Centro de 
Información Judicial 2009j).  
 
The lack of involvement by the private sector calls attention. The private sector is part of the 
problem, but it does not seem to see itself as part of the solution (Napoli 2009: 42). What kind 
of financial responsibility the companies should have regarding the health damages they have 
imposed on the population of the river basin is a very touchy issue. According to Rossi, 
Argentina’s legislation on environmental law states that the author of the damage has to 
respond with compensation to the environment and to the victims. However, it is still a 
mystery what the Supreme Court will do regarding the financial responsibility of the 
companies; it is not clear what the judgement says about the role of the companies in 
financing the projects to clean the river. Therefore, the companies wait and take little action. 
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Rossi claims that they do so because they consider it a good deal to wait and see if the court 
will issue another judgment regarding the companies,  “[…] Because in Latin American 
countries to wait is a good deal […] authorities change very frequently. Economic crisis 
happens quite often, and citizenship has very bad memory. So if you have the ability to wait, 
to let things keep going, probably you are going to make good business,” Rossi said (Rossi, 
personal interview 2009). 
 
Another group of actors that influence the implementation of the judgement with respect to 
industrial control are the inspectors. They are being trained to carry out inspections of the 
industries that are registered in the river basin area. However, according to Rossi it has been 
difficult for ACUMAR to find people who can be trained to work as inspectors. As quoted by  
Rossi: 
Inspectors are something like what we call “la legión extranjera” […] so they 
did not know why they were working for this project, they were not confident 
in the basin authority, they were not confident in the leadership of the ministry 
of environment. They were not confident in the NGOs. So it is very difficult to 
work with those people. They used to think in this way; the court will change, 
the ministry will change, the NGOs will get older and all these young guys are 
going to start to work seriously in some company – and we will remain here. 
And so, who has the power? We have the power. That’s the way they used to 
speak for themselves (Rossi 2009).   
With so many influential actors not supporting the implementation of the judgement, 
combined with widespread corruption, controlling industrial pollution is challenging. On the 
other hand, one of the reasons why the ACUMAR has done so little effort in inspecting the 
industries may be that tighter regulation of the industries may come into conflict with broader 
policy goals, such as economic development. 
 
Challenges in creating health policies 
Making a health policy to attend the population at risk is a difficult topic, and the reflections 
by Rossi may help to understand why ACUMAR has not yet managed to comply with the 
judgement that ordered them to carry out an investigation on the health risks and to make an 
emergency health plan to attend the population at risk. It is estimated that 3,5 million people 
in some way are affected by the pollution in the river basin. Most of the affected population 
do not have access to basic services like water and sanitation, which in itself is an exposure to 
pollution. However, you will find a similar situation in other areas of the country, in which 
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people live in shantytowns or in other poor areas of the country lacking access to water and 
sanitation services. So the policymakers have to analyze very seriously in what way the 
industrial pollution of the Matanza-Riachuelo is responsible for the health problems of the 
people living there, or if they are facing a “regular” exposure of contamination similar to that 
of other people living in other poor areas of Argentina. If the answer is that all the people 
living in the river basin area are exposed to the same industrial pollution, the danger is that it 
will be too much, and that the problem will immediately be turned into a political problem 
and never be solved. On the other extreme, if you say that the population of the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin is mainly exposed to poverty-related pollution because of the lack of for 
example water and sanitation services, it would not be a good message for the polluters, for 
the population and for the policymakers. So you have to find a reasonable measure to this 
problem and put the problem in a reasonable way. You will never find a perfect case, in 
which a person has cancer, and one specific company exclusively causes this cancer and the 
company has to pay for health care for this person. The cases that you find in the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin are those of a more or less defined group that has more or less extra 
problems with their health, and a more or less defined group of companies that has been there 
for a long time. And with those factors you will have to find a more or less fair solution. This 
is one of the reasons why making a public policy to attend the population affected by the 
pollution is difficult, according to Rossi (Rossi 2009, personal interview). 
 
Political will 
Political will in implementing the judgement will of course increase the likelihood of 
compliance with the terms of judgement. The Kirchners’ government wanted to show 
commitment in making a plan for cleaning the Matanza-Riachuelo. According to Rossi (2009) 
that is why the former government of President Kirchner requited Romina Piccolotti as a 
ministry of environment, as a way to show that there was an environmental lawyer dealing 
with a very difficult plan. Later, the same government decided that Romina Piccolotti had to 
leave office. “It was because they only wanted to show a bit of commitment, but not enough 
commitment to resolve the problem itself,” Rossi said (however, the explanations for why she 
had to leave office vary between different sources).  
 
Attacking the companies that are not dealing environmentally friendly could be costly, 
because it may come into conflict with broader policy goals, such as economic growth. 
Having recently experienced the worst economic crisis in modern history, the Kirchner 
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government led an economic policy of export led growth (Levitsky and Murillo 2008: 17). If 
the government would lead an environmental policy that would make companies leave the 
country or impose regulations that would impede foreign investment in Argentina, it could 
come into conflict with the broader policy goal of economic growth. One of the explanations 
for the lack of political will to control industrial pollution may be that the government could 
have considered the judgement to be too costly to implement. Juan Carlos Villalonga in 
Greenpeace Argentina has argued that “The problem has always been the lack of political 
will,” a view that is shared by representatives from other NGOs (Valente 2009). Whether or 
not the lack of compliance is due to lack of political will or lack of resources is not the most 
important question in this thesis. However, it has been important to carefully explore the 
dynamics in the implementation process in order to be able to understand the broader policy 
impact of the judgement. Before discussing the policy impact of the litigation process in more 
detail, I will present the conclusions made by the monitoring committee regarding the extent 
of compliance with the judgement 17 months after the landmark judgement
11
 (El Cuerpo 
Colegiado 2009). 
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The main conclusions in the report from the monitoring committee will be presented in the 
following section, with a particular focus on health policies.  According to the judgement, the 
ACUMAR first had to create a socio-demographic map and carry out investigations on 
environmental risk factors in order to determine the population at risk, and then within 60 
days elaborate and put into effect specific health programs to meet the needs of the people 
affected by the river basin pollution (Lorenzetti et al. 2008: 13-14). The monitoring 
committee concluded that 17 months after the judgement there had been some progress in 
implementing the court order, such as carrying out a survey of risk factors and the making of 
a socio-demographic map. This survey indicates that 96.4 per cent of the population are 
subject to at least one environmental threat. A scientific epidemiological study (a study of 
factors affecting the health of populations) requires a long time perspective, and what the 
ACUMAR has done so far is to make a survey. A health plan has been presented by the 
ACUMAR in the Integrated Plan, but this plan does not constitute a regional policy, integral 
and specific for the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin as ordered by the Court (El Cuerpo 
                                                
11
 This report represents the latest in-depth report on compliance from the monitoring committee before cut-off 
date for data-collection  
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Colegiado 2009: 42-46). The Integrated Plan has also been criticised for not considering 
health as one of the central themes in their work to clean the river (Nápoli and Espil 2010: 
235). The Quilmes Court demanded modifications to the Health plan in order to implement an 
integrated and regional health policy for the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin (Nápoli and Espil 
2010). The responsible authorities have not complied with the part of the Judgement that 
ordered them to make and implement plans for health attention for the population at risk 
(FARN 2010c; El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009: 42-46). As stated by the World Health 
Organization, an inclusive understanding of health requires a healthy environment (World 
Health Organization 2010; Nápoli and Espil 2010: 226). Therefore, in order to assess the 
impact on health policies, we have to assess the compliance with the other parts of the court 
order, the parts of the Judgement that deal with the more underlying conditions for a healthy 
environment.  
 
The lack of access to potable water constitutes one on the main causes for illnesses in the 
river basin, and the Supreme Court ordered in the judgement the ACUMAR to expand the 
web of potable water, and to report and inform the public on the plan and work of extending 
the access to potable water. They also demanded the ACUMAR to take urgent action to assist 
those who use underground water sources that is not suitable for human consumption. The 
monitoring committee has observed several actions in order to comply with the orders from 
the Supreme Court, and argues that these should continue and be completed (FARN 2010c; El 
Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
55 per cent of the population lacked sewage services in 2009, and the sewage problem is one 
of the main sources of contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin (Napoli 2009: 9-
11). Although the ACUMAR has taken actions in order to comply with the order from the 
Supreme Court, the monitoring committee concluded that 17 months after the judgement 
these have been insufficient and unsatisfactory, and that they should intensify their actions in 
order for 100 per cent of the population to have sewage services. The analysis by the 
monitoring committee also calls for strengthening the role of the Secretary for Environment 
and Sustainable Development in order to secure a transparent and efficient management (El 
Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
Industrial contamination is one of the main sources of pollution of the river basin. At a public 
hearing on 6 October 2009 judge Armella at the Quilmes Court highlighted the need to focus 
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on the control of industrial pollution, saying that it is “one of the pillars of the clean-up” 
(Centro de Información Judicial 2009j). The conclusion from the monitoring committee 17 
months after the judgement is that some action has been taken to comply with the court order, 
but that these actions have been insufficient and unsatisfactory. For example, only 20 per cent 
of the companies registered by ACUMAR had been inspected (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
Waste fills in open air are one of the main sources of pollution in the Matanza-Riachuelo river 
basin, and constitutes a great health risk on the population living by or on top of the waste 
fills. No action has been taken to relocate the people living on garbage fills, and this 
constitutes an emergency situation. Although the monitoring committee did observe some 
actions in order to implement the judgement, ACUMAR has not complied with most of their 
obligations (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009).  
 
In the Judgement the Supreme Court ordered to clean the riverbanks and solve the housing 
problem in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin area. The conclusions from the monitoring 
committee 17 months after the judgement are that some actions have been taken to comply 
with the court order regarding cleaning the river banks and the housing problem, but that 
these have not been sufficient and not satisfactory, and that they have not managed to make 
an integral plan on how to solve the problem (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009; FARN 2010c).  
 
The Supreme Court ordered the construction of a storm drainage system. This is important in 
order to create a healthy environment, as the highly contaminated river is often flooded. The 
monitoring committee concluded that some actions have been taken in order to comply with 
the judgement, but that these are not sufficient and not satisfactory (El Cuerpo Colegiado 
2009; FARN 2010c).  
 
Another very important part of the judgement is the implementation of a measurement system 
for measuring compliance with the objectives in the judgement. The Supreme Court ordered 
the ACUMAR to adopt one of the existing international measurement systems available 
within 90 working days. The deadline has now by far expired, and the monitoring committee 
concluded that ACUMAR has not complied with the judgement (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009). 
This represents is a serious lack of compliance, because having and using a system for 
measuring compliance is essential in order to secure both judicial and citizen control of 
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compliance with the program, and makes measuring compliance within the other aspects of 
the judgement difficult.  
 
The Supreme Court ordered the responsible authorities to organize a system for public 
information for the public via Internet. This system should give clear, consistent and 
accessible information including facts, reports, lists and registers, timelines, costs etc. The 
monitoring committee concludes that the responsible authorities have carried out some 
actions to comply with the judgement, but that these have been insufficient and 
unsatisfactory. As an example, ACUMAR’s web page does not constitute an adequate system 
for public information about the activities that they carry out in order to implement the 
judgement, something that makes control with the implementation and public participation 
difficult (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009: 11-13).  
 
The overall conclusions regarding the impact of the litigation process in the Mendoza case is 
that some important steps are taken regarding improving the environmental health of the 
population in the river basin, but that the deadlines in the Judgement have expired with slow 
progress and many issues pending. The Judgement represents “an historic opportunity that 
still demands more political commitment and more efficient management (my translation)” 
(Nápoli and Espil 2010: 197). On the other hand, the litigation process has forced the public 
administration to start working out public policies at the level of the river basin, and all 
though the deadlines have expired, the reporting and follow-up by the monitoring committee, 
the Quilmes Court and the Supreme Court impede the responsible authorities from 
abandoning the work to implement public policies to clean the river basin.  
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY IMPACT 
This chapter will assess the policy impact of the Mendoza case more systematically, along the 
lines of the analytical framework. Without a proper contextual analysis of the litigation 
process, it is difficult to know the actual impact of specific landmark cases (Gloppen 2009: 
467). In assessing impact, I will therefore look for simultaneous processes that can also have 
contributed to the observed change in policies.  
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The most important impact of the Mendoza case is that it opened the political space for a 
problem that the political authorities had paid little or no attention to. "We need to open this 
issue to society, because that is the way to raise awareness about a problem and achieve 
solutions. The laws serve no one if social practice follows other paths," said judge Ricardo 
Lorenzetti, author of the Supreme Court ruling at the Environmental Law and Policy 
conference in 2006 (Valente 2006a). He recognized that it was the first time that the Supreme 
Court had focused on a collective good like the environment, and that it was done in order to 
put the matter on the agenda of social debate (Valente 2006a). As already explained, the 
response by the Supreme Court opened the political space and forced the responsible 
authorities to start working on the issue, and to listen to the response by the other parts in the 
lawsuit. On the other hand, it has moved the policy area to the judicial arena. Five of the 
NGOs that had previously worked on the topic together with the Ombudsman and other 
NGOs were included in the litigation process, but some of the NGOs were left outside this 
process. The policy area has been legalized. But not only has the policy area been legalized, it 
has brought environmental policies on the political agenda. 
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As has been showed in the analysis of the litigation process, the Mendoza case has lead to 
remarkable changes in the policymaking process. In June 2006, in which the Supreme Court 
accepted the case and ordered a plan to clean the river, the court forced the political 
authorities to open the political space to deal with a problem that had been ignored by 
policymakers and that had been locked in a tangle of different jurisdictions. New procedures 
for resolving disputes have been settled. The Supreme Court ordered the authorities to make 
an Integrated Plan to clean the river, and ordered the plan to be discussed in a series of public 
hearings, in which all parts of the lawsuit got the chance to present their view. In this way, the 
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Supreme Court fostered a dialogue between the parties in the case, and made them talk and 
exchange view on the problem in a way that had never been done before.  
 
One of the most important direct effect of the litigation process is the creation of a river basin 
committee, the ACUMAR (Farstein and Morales 2009). Although the NGOs and the Quilmes 
Court report on weaknesses in its organizational structure and commitment (to mention some 
of the criticisms) it represents an important institutional change that will change the dispute 
settlement procedures for the future. This institutional change, along with the creation of a 
monitoring committee to secure citizen control with the implementation, and the appointment 
of a federal judge at the Quilmes Court to be in charge of judicial control with the 
implementation, gives a great deal of assurance that the political authorities will not be able to 
abandon the case once the Supreme Court closes it. In the recent development we have seen 
that the Supreme Court is still taking care of the case and issues follow-up judgements when 
they see serious lack of compliance. This quote by lawyers at CELS sum up the significance 
of the intervention by the Supreme Court with regard to important policy impact of the 
litigation:   
“The litigation and intervention by the Supreme Court has provoked, and could 
generate, a modification in the institutional and social practices regarding the 
river basin with respect to the intra- and inter-jurisdictional coordination, the 
instances and mechanisms for consultation, participation and demands, such as 
the capacity and the willingness of the authorities to respond to the demands 
(my translation)” (Fairstein and Morales 2009: 348).  
Nevertheless, the socio-environmental character of the Matanza-Riachuelo problem requires 
the participation and involvement of the whole society (Napoli 2009: 42).  The monitoring 
committee argues that there has been a serious lack of citizen participation in the decision-
making process. The Commission for Social Participation within ACUMAR has been 
consulted only twice since 2007, and the monitoring committee observes with great 
preoccupation the lack of interest within the ACUMAR to implement the mechanisms for 
citizen participation (FARN 2009a; El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009). This indicates that some of 
the institutional changes have influenced the policy-making process more on paper than in 
practice. Despite of this, as noted by a member of the Boca Neighborhood Association, 
“Before we did not know with whom to talk. Now we do, there are projects, meetings and 
new offices (my translation),” said Cristina Fins, vice president of the Boca Neighbourhood 
Association (Fins and Alberti 2009, personal interview).  
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Furthermore, according to Alfredo Alberti in the Boca Neighbourhood association, "the 
citizen organizations are also better positioned now to defend the watershed” (Valente 2009). 
Andrés Napoli in FARN said that; "The intervention of the Supreme Court is a fundamental 
difference. It gives us a great deal of assurance" (Valente 2009). Therefore, all though there is 
still a long way to go before the river is clean, the policymaking process regarding the river 
basin has changed completely from before the Supreme Court accepted the case in 2006.  
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As showed in the analytical framework, we have a direct policy impact when public policies 
are formulated or reformulated as part of the implementation process. According to Rossi, 
almost everybody agree that the changes in policies are a consequence of the litigation 
process. There had been a project and plan to clean the river earlier, but this was not 
completed. The plan that the political authorities presented to the Supreme Court in 2006, 
builds on the plan that the Federal Government worked on earlier. In fact, until the 
presentation of the new Integrated Plan in January 2010, they continued working on the basis 
of what Rossi referred to as “the executive summary of a plan that was never approved” 
(Rossi 2009, personal interview). All though the monitoring committee report on lack of 
compliance, the enforcement mechanisms set up by the Supreme Court push them to work on 
implementing public policies for cleaning the river basin, and makes it impossible for them to 
abandon the policy area.  
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There litigation process has also lead to important changes regarding budgetary allocations, 
financing and more transparency regarding the economic aspect of the work to clean the river 
basin. The National Congress has now approved a budget for cleaning the river, but the 
projects in the new Integrated Plan to clean the river basin does not correspond to this budget 
(Nápoli and Espil 2010: 238). Having a separate budget for cleaning the river basin will 
centralize power and transparency and secure more accountability for the program, and not 
just keeping all the money within a “black box” inside the federal government so that they 
would have to all the time negotiate with other projects. In that way the ACUMAR will be 
given more power than to just administer and decide. There was however a considerable 
opposition among the federal government to let the ACUMAR administrate their own budget 
(Rossi, personal interview).  The federal state received a loan of 840 USD from the World 
Bank and the IDB to finance some of the projects of infrastructure (Centro de Información 
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Judicial 2009i). Furthermore, the Audit General of the Nation was set up to secure more 
transparency with regard to the economic aspects of the implementation of the plan 
(Lorenzetti 2008). These aspects will secure more transparency and make it less likely that 
what happened in the 1990s will happen again, when a loan given to clean the river was spent 
on social plans during the economic crisis. Even though representatives from the NGOs say 
that the problem is the lack of will and not the lack of money, they say that the economic 
situation we have now is more favourable than the situation before (Valente 2009).  
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The Mendoza case has changed the access to information and degree of transparency of 
activities in the river basin. The Supreme Court ordered in its judgement to implement a 
system for public information that would present updated, detailed and clear information for 
the public (Lorenzetti et al. 2008; Farstein and Morales 2009). The ACUMAR has established 
a web page in which they present what they do, but this website does not provide information 
that is comprehensible to the public (El Cuerpo Colegiado 2009). This makes it difficult for a 
person living in the river basin area to find information about what actions have been taken in 
order to improve the environmental state of the area close to his/her residence. Hence, there 
have been important changes in the degree of transparency and access to information, but the 
information provided by ACUMAR does not fulfill the criteria by the court order, and makes 
it impossible for anyone not specialized in the field to evaluate the work and actions taken by 
the ACUMAR.  
 
On the other hand, the Quilmes Court, the monitoring committee and organizations such as 
FARN monitor frequently on progress in the implementation of the judgment. The centre for 
Juridical Information (CIJ) also publishes frequent news about Riachuelo and decisions by the 
Quilmes court and by the Supreme Court. The organizations of the civil society use the media 
in order to inform the public about the (lack of) compliance with the judgment, and ask for 
greater transparency and access to information. An example is the demand from FARN and 
the monitoring committee to publish the list of industries that had been inspected and 
identified as “contaminating agents.” The ACUMAR did not publish this list before claims 
were made by the organizations of the civil society (FARN 2009f). The media attention has 
been far greater after the Supreme Court decided to take up the collective environmental case 
(FARN 2009b). Therefore, there has been considerable change in access to information about 
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the activities in the river basin, even though the responsible authorities have not fully 
complied with the court order to provide up-dated information accessible to the public.  
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According the Rodriguez-Garavito’s (2010) framework, direct policy impact happen when the 
judgement change the conduct of the actors involved in the lawsuit, either litigants, 
beneficiaries or the target of the litigation.  
 
The Ombudsman, NGOs and the Auditor General had published several reports earlier 
without any response from the responsible authorities. Due to the litigation process the 
responsible authorities have changed their conduct to the extent that they have made an inter-
jurisdictional River Basin Committee (ACUMAR) and started to work out public policies to 
clean the river, but compliance with the terms of the judgement has been modest according to 
the monitoring committee and the Quilmes Court. On the other hand, compared to before the 
court accepted the case, there have been important changes. As noted earlier, in Argentina 
there has been no tradition for inter-jurisdictional cooperation, but the formation of 
ACUMAR is a remarkable step towards acknowledging that environmental policy is a policy 
area that demand more inter-jurisdictional cooperation. There is now a better coordination of 
environmental policies. Argentina has not previously monitored the state of the environment, 
but the court ordered them to do so. Although the political authorities have not complied with 
this demand yet, the constant pressure for implementing an international measurement system 
for monitoring the environment in the river basin may lead to greater progress than if the 
judgement had never taken place. Along with the General Environmental Law that was passed 
in 2002, some important steps have been taken towards implementing minimum standards for 
environmental protection and reduce the enforcement gap/the policy gap between 
environmental law and environmental policies. It is interesting to see it in a counterfactual 
perspective, as some of my informants did. Lourdes Bascary, former officer at the Secretary 
of Environment, said that ”Without the litigation, I don’t think that we would have seen as 
much advances (my translation)” (Bascary, personal interview 2009). On the other hand, the 
observed changes in environmental policies must be seen in the light of the fact that in 2006, 
the year when the political authorities had to start working out a plan to clean the river, was 
the first time that an Environmental lawyer and Human Rights activist, Romina Picolotti, took 
office at the Secretary of Environment.  
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The judiciary has had an important role as a horizontal accountability mechanism for holding 
the political authorities accountable for their legal environmental obligations, and by ordering 
the political authorities to take action regarding the environmental pollution of the river basin 
and to implement the right to a healthy environment. All though the political authorities have 
not made a health plan to attend the affected population, the topic on environmental health has 
been put on the political agenda by the Court’s response. The changing role of the Supreme 
Court with regard to taking up an environmental case in the manner that it did could be seen 
as a move to increase its legitimacy and independence.  
 
The conduct of the companies have not changed substantially, and according to Rossi they 
prefer to wait and see if the Supreme Court will issue another judgement (Rossi 2009, 
personal interview). On the other hand, the conduct of the companies cannot be expected to 
change until the ACUMAR intensifies the inspections in order to identify the “contaminating 
agents.” A larger number of inspectors may improve the enforcement capacity of the Ministry 
of Environment, and has the potential to improve the regulation of the private sector. 
However, the greater awareness of the environment and environmental and human rights 
responsibility of firms must be seen in a broader political context. The Centre for Human 
Rights and Environment (CEDHA) has been pushing for legal reforms that balance investor 
rights and responsibilities between human rights and environment (Newell and Muro 2006: 
64). Romina Picolotti, the former Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development, 
had earlier been the president of CEDAH. This can also explain the growing emphasis on the 
human rights responsibility of firms in the public debate. In any case, just the fact that the 
political authorities have been forced to make a plan to regulate the industries in the river 
basin represent a progress compared to the lack of regulation in Argentina’s environmental 
history.  
 
The NGOs and the Ombudsman have changed their conduct in the way that they, along with 
the Quilmes court, have an institutionalised role in the follow-up of the implementation of the 
judgement, and new coalitions between NGOs and the Ombudsman have been formed and 
institutionalized through the monitoring committee set up by the court.  
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The Mendoza case has received much attention from the media, and the NGOs, the Centre for 
Juridical Information (CIJ) and the National Ombudsman have actively informed the public 
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about the process. The Mendoza case has created media attention and has brought social and 
environmental rights issues into the social and political discourse. The importance of the 
problems of the Matanza-Riachuelo, and the environmental harm imposed on the people 
living near the river basin, has earlier systematically been excluded from the public agenda. 
However, the lawsuit began to change this situation (Nápoli in FARN 2009b: 88).  The 
Mendoza case helped to bring environmental issues into the public eye (Di Paola in FARN 
2009b: 13).  
 
The Mendoza case has generated several websites, blogs and links at the official web pages of 
public institutions such as the Supreme Court, the National Ombudsman, and Organizations 
that were third-party actors in the lawsuit. The emergence of new technologies has enabled a 
“massification” of information about the Matanza-Riachuelo, and represents alternative 
channels that have gained a lot of strength. However, the power of the more “traditional” 
mass media such as newspaper, radio and television is still undeniable for civil society 
organizations that aim to influence public and private decision-makers. In the beginning the 
presswork of FARN in the mass media was mainly focused on publicizing the advances and 
events related to the lawsuit, such as new written presentations, public hearings and reports. 
However, as time went by, the media attention regarding the Mendoza case has been growing, 
and the case has been discussed in television programs, radio interviews and there have been 
frequent publications in major newspapers such as La Nación, Página and Crítica de la 
Argentina. One of the reasons why this case has received so much attention by the mass 
media is perhaps that it is an issue that affects a very large number of people (Sangalli in 
FARN 2009b: 156-160).   
 
An important indirect policy impact of the litigation process in the Mendoza case is that it has 
created a lot of media attention, and civil society organizations have actively used media as a 
strategy to influence public and private decision-makers, as well as to create rights awareness. 
However, the increased attention on environmental issues in the media must be seen in the 
context of a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay over the construction of paper pulp mills 
on the Uruguayan side of a border river, a dispute that for the first time brought 
environmental issues on the front pages of Argentine newspapers (Hochstetler 2010; Valente 
2010a). Along with other simultaneous processes the Mendoza case has brought increased 
attention to environmental suffering in the national media.  
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In some ways my own work could also be seen in this context. In the course of the interviews 
Carolina Farstein at CELS expressed interest in a master thesis that could contribute to make 
this case known internationally. During the fieldwork in Buenos Aires the Boca 
Neighbourhood Association expressed their wish that I would make the Mendoza case known 
in the media in my home country, and not only within the academic circles. This shows that 
creating awareness of the case both nationally and internationally is an important part of the 
agenda of the NGOs working on the issue of Matanza-Riachuelo.  
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The indirect effects could be to stimulate social mobilization through framing the needs of the 
marginalized people in terms of violations of rights. Therefore, litigation may create rights 
awareness and encourage advocacy. The Mendoza case has contributed to motivate legal 
mobilization around environmental rights, and has created awareness about the inclusive 
understanding on the right to health, which also includes the right to a healthy environment.  
The public interest litigation in the Mendoza case has placed the needs of the marginalized 
people living near the river basin in a perspective of rights violations. Dr. Ricardo L. 
Lorenzetti, president of the Supreme Court of the Nation, said that “In an historical event 
people who felt isolated and marginalized filed a case to the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Court decided to take up the collective environmental case” (Lorenzetti in Centro de 
Información Judicial 2009c). “It is historical that the Supreme Court is taking part in an 
environmental lawsuit (my translation),” said Cristina Fins, vice president of the Boca 
Neighbourhood Association (Fins 2009, personal interview). The decision not only made an 
impact amongst those directly involved in the lawsuit, but also in the judicial arena. It caused 
a buzz at a Latin American conference on environmental law and policy held in Buenos Aires 
in 2006, with officials from legal systems across the region. "It's a landmark; an excellent 
ruling," said Enrique Peretti, a judge on the Supreme Court of Santa Cruz province. "It 
incorporates future generations as subjects of law and sets guidelines to follow in those 
cases." (Valente 2006a).“In this context, the Matanza-Riachuelo ruling taught a lesson. "For 
environmental justice in Argentina and Latin America this is a “leading case.” The Court has 
given us a marvellous lesson. This is what we judges should be doing, not just writing lovely 
words, but rather establishing the mode and the deadline for compliance with our decisions," 
expressed Aida Kemelmajer, a justice on the provincial Supreme Court of Mendoza (Valente 
2006a). This shows that the Mendoza case has had an important impact on the judicial arena 
and for developing jurisprudence on environmental rights.  
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The Mendoza case has encouraged advocacy on similar cases. According to Florencia 
Saulino, law clerk at the Supreme Court of the Nation, other organizations or groups of 
neighbours from other polluted rivers have now started to present twin cases or similar kind 
of cases trying to get the same results as in the Mendoza case. When the Supreme Court is 
involved, it gives the case some publicity and creates media attention, and in certain ways the 
organizations are looking for that, and go directly to the Supreme Court. However, the 
problem with these cases is that they are not always within the original jurisdiction of the 
court. The litigants present the cases directly to the Supreme Court, but if the river is not 
inter-jurisdictional, the Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction and cannot hear the 
case. Therefore, these cases have to go to the district courts before they can go to the Supreme 
Court, Saulino explained (Saulino 2009, personal interview).  
 
One twin case, in which the residents are hoping for a similar ruling as in the Mendoza case, 
is the “Reconquista river.” The Reconquista river runs through 18 different outlying districts 
of Greater Buenos Aires, and affects the lives of more than four million people. “By means of 
the Special Report on the Reconquista River Basin and a lawsuit filed by environmental 
organisations, local residents hope the case will make it all the way up to the Supreme Court” 
(Valente 2007). "The report is very solid and gives us a strong scientific basis for legal 
action," Martín Nunziata, an activist in the Aprodelta environmental organisation, told IPS. 
"The situation here is identical to what we see in the Riachuelo, and the waters also run into 
the Río de la Plata estuary," noted Nunziata, who lives in the delta (Valente 2007). According 
to ISP/Tierramérica, The Argentine Association of Environmental Lawyers brought legal 
action against the Federal Government and the Province of Buenos Aires, in order to hold 
them accountable for the state of the river and demand an immediate halt to polluting 
activities. The lawyers, who represent local residents, “have urged the Supreme Court to take 
action, just as it did in the case of the Riachuelo, to force the authorities to clean up the river” 
(Valente 2007). 
 
The public interest litigation case has created right awareness, not only amongst the Beatriz 
Mendoza and her neighbours in Villa Inflamable, but among the population in the river basin 
and in Argentina in general. Amongst others, FARN has published information on the 
Matanza-Riachuelo river basin in English (FARN 2009b; FARN 2008). The spread of 
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information about the Mendoza case on the World Wide Web may create rights awareness 
both nationally and internationally, although it is unknown to what degree it has done so yet.  
Another interesting aspect regarding the development of social rights jurisprudence is the link 
between the structural judgement on the rights for the forcefully displaced people in 
Colombia and the Mendoza case. Carolina Farstein at CELS said in an interview, when I 
asked if they knew other similar cases, that “we cited in our presentation to the court the case 
on displaced people in Colombia, because it is similar in the way that it is also a structural 
problem, in which the solution depends on several ministries, and the coordination between 
different state agencies. And also in which the court started to create indicators and goals and 
finishing lines (my translation)” (Farstein 2009, personal interview). This shows how 
litigation and jurisprudence in one country may have an impact on litigation and 
jurisprudence in other countries, and may explain why the policy impact of the two cases are 
similar in some aspects, as will be illustrated later.  
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Symbolic effects consist of changes in ideas, perceptions and collective social constructs that 
relate to the situation of the litigants (Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 4). Sociologist Javier Ayero 
and social anthropologist Débora A. Swistun (2009) have done a very interesting 
ethnographic study of environmental suffering in the argentine shantytown “Villa 
Inflamable,” the highly polluted neighborhood of Beatriz Mendoza and the other initial 
litigants in the Mendoza case. In the book called Flammable. Environmental suffering in an 
argentine shantytown, they try to understand the modes of experiencing environmental 
suffering and how the residents make sense of their risky surroundings. Moreover, 
“Flammable is also a story of silent habituation to contamination and of almost complete 
absence off mass protest against toxic onslaught” (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 4). The study 
explores and tries to understand how “words and actions by outside agents give form to the 
ways residents think and feel about their lives and their surroundings” (Auyero and Swistun 
2009: 159). They find that “lawyers’ deeds and words are now part of residents’ schemes of 
perception and evaluation.” However, the changes in perceptions are not only caused by 
lawyers, but also by government officials and local physicians (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 
157). This study gives an interesting view on the more symbolic effects of the process in 
which lawyers and other simultaneous processes change their perceptions of environmental 
suffering, and how, “In a nutshell, Flammable residents’ experiences of their polluted 
surroundings are socially and politically determined. They do not follow straightforwardly 
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from the toxic environment but from schemes of perception, appreciations, and action that 
have been shaped by history and discursive and material interventions” (Auyero and Swistun 
2009: 145).  
 
Representing the findings in the typology suggested by Rodriguez-Garavito (2010) is useful 
in order to compare the policy impact of the Mendoza case with the only other (as far as I 
know) systematic assessment of policy impact of structural judgments, which is the judgment 
of forcefully displaced people in Colombia.  
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Figure 2: Typology of different policy effects of the Mendoza case 
Direct       Indirect 
 
 
 
 
 
Material 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbolic 
 
Formulation and reformulation of plans to clean the river 
 
Formation of an inter-jurisdictional river basin committee 
 
Inclusion of NGOs and the Ombudsman in the public hearings 
 
Creation of a monitoring committee 
 
Appointment of a federal judge at the Quilmes Court to ensure 
judicial control with the implementation of the judgment 
 
Improvements in the funding of the project to clean the river 
 
Works on public infrastructure to extend public services for 
water and sanitation 
 
Partly change in conduct of policymakers (lack of compliance) 
 
Not change in conduct of the companies 
 
New actors emerge in the public debate; NGOs and the 
Ombudsman’s Office seek to influence the policy-making 
process 
 
More advocacies on the right to a healthy environment 
 
Increased media attention and public deliberation about the 
topic 
 
 
Perception of the problem as a violation of the right to a 
healthy environment 
 
 
Transforming public opinion about the urgency and gravity of 
the pollution problem, because of more media attention on the 
topic 
 
Changes in the litigants’ ideas, perception and collective social 
construct regarding environmental suffering 
 
Legitimizing the litigants’ view on health problems caused by 
pollution 
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As the typology above shows, the litigation process in the Mendoza case has produced several 
effects. These findings are similar to the findings in Garavito and Franco’s study on the policy 
impact of a structural Judgement on the rights of forcefully displaced people in Colombia, the 
Judgement T-025 of 2004 by the Colombian Constitutional Court (Garavito and Franco 2009; 
Rodriguez-Garavito 2010). They also conclude that although the political authorities have 
only partially complied with the Judgement, and the situation for the forcefully displaced 
people has not changed substantially since the Judgement, the Judgement has fostered a range 
of effects; direct, indirect, material and symbolic effects. Some of the effects of this 
Judgement are that the topic of forced displacement was put on the public agenda, it fostered 
social mobilization around the rights of forcefully displaced people, it lead to changes in the 
public opinion about the right in question, and it initiated a “gradual transformation of the 
state machinery for attending the displaced population, among other consequences” 
(Rodriguez-Garavito 2010: 5). In-depth case studies on these two cases, the T-025 of 2004 in 
Colombia and the Mendoza case in Argentina, indicate similar kinds of policy impact. This 
represents an interesting finding, and this analysis contributes to building comparative 
empirical knowledge about the broader policy impact of structural Judgements.  
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Gargarella argues that one of the approaches that judges could take in order to force the 
political authorities to consider a structural problem that cause a massive violation of rights is 
to call for an open discussion (Gargarella 2010: 10).  As we have seen in the analysis, the 
Supreme Court of the Nation ordered a series of public hearings between June 2006 and July 
2008, in which representatives of all those potentially affected by the decision got the chance 
to participate in the collective discussion.  
Given that judges are not authorized to choose and carry out public policies, 
such interventions should be reserved for extreme situations: The idea is not 
that judges should use public meetings to define and enforce a particular policy, 
but rather that they help to put into motion the legislative machinery and, if 
necessary, oversee the entire dialogic process. The notable series of public 
audiences called by Argentina’s Supreme Court in the Matanza-Riachuelo 
River Basin case are exemplar, in this respect (Gargarella 2010: 10).  
On the other hand, the steps taken by the Supreme Court in 2008, in which it ordered the 
implementation of a program of public policies, have been criticised at a blog about the 
Supreme Court. Adjudicating the environmental Mendoza case has been important for 
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restoring the legitimacy of the new Supreme Court (VTC 2010). Nevertheless, VTC
1
 argues 
that the court has done a series of “procedural pirouettes” in this case, and he argues that the 
court has interpreted the procedures in a very flexible way. Furthermore, VTC argues that 
what the court has done in the Mendoza case represents formidable challenges for the role of 
the court, and he argues that “the Court has failed in its explanation, basis and argumentation 
for the new role that it was playing (my translation)” (VTC 2010). I will not to go further into 
this discussion, but it is an interesting and important discussion, and as we see courts around 
the world taking a “new” role in enforcing social and environmental rights, it gives 
implications for further research on the role of courts in a democracy. 
                                                
1
 The person who posted this on the blog about the Supreme Court did not appear with full name. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed the policy effects of  “The Mendoza case,” a structural litigation case 
that holds the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos 
Aires responsible for the environmental contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin 
in Argentina. The research question was: What has been the policy impact of the litigation 
process in “The Mendoza case?”  
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In order to answer the research question I carried out an in-depth case study. The Mendoza 
case represents a structural case, a new generation of cases that emerge progressively within 
the region. As explained earlier, structural cases are characterized by a large number of 
persons who claim that their rights have been violated, litigants who claim that state agencies 
are responsible for the systematic failure of or lack of public policies, and judgments that 
order complex remedies and instruct various public entities to undertake coordinated actions 
to protect the entire affected population, not only the litigants. 
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This case study applied an analytical framework that sees the litigation process as an 
integrated process involving voicing a claim into the legal system, the response by the court, 
the capability of the judges to find judicial remedies and the process of implementing the 
judgement. Through a thick description of the Mendoza case the analysis explores the 
dynamics in the litigation process and its policy effects at all stages of the process. The 
analysis employs an interpretive approach to assessing policy impact. An interpretive 
approach assumes that litigation may have considerable indirect policy impact as well as 
direct policy impacts. Before carrying out the analysis I outlined the expected types of effects; 
direct, indirect, material and symbolic effects, according to an analytical framework. A 
typology of the different kinds of expected effects was presented, and later applied in the 
analysis of the Mendoza case.    
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Before the case was filed to the Supreme Court, neighbour organizations had turned to the 
Ombudsman’s office to address the violations of their right to a healthy environment. 
Together with the Ombudsman and NGOs they published several reports about the state of the 
river and the health risks for people living in the river basin area, but the political authorities 
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did not respond to the problem that was addressed. The political authorities did not take any 
action to solve the problem until the Supreme Court decided to accept a case that was filed by 
Beatriz Mendoza and others in the polluted shantytown “Villa Inflammable.” The case was 
filed against the National Government, the Province of Buenos Aires, the City of Buenos 
Aires and 44 companies for the health damages they suffered from because of the 
contamination of the river basin.  
 
An analysis of the entire litigation process gave a very interesting insight into how all stages 
of the process had an important impact on public policies and on social and legal 
mobilization. Among the litigants there was actually a collective disbelief in collective action 
to address the problem. The private lawyers first “formed” the voice of the litigants, then their 
voice once more was “modified” in the way that the Supreme Court rejected the individual 
claims and accepted the collective environmental case. When the Supreme Court of the 
Nation accepted the Ombudsman and five NGOs as third parties to the case, it affected the 
social mobilization around the contamination of the Matanza-Riachuelo river. Suddenly the 
whole policy area got legalized, and the NGOs that were parts to the case moved their efforts 
to influence the policy-makers to the judicial arena.  
 
The Supreme Court ordered the responsible authorities to present an integrated plan for how 
to solve the pollution problem in the river basin. The responsible authorities formed an inter-
jurisdictional River Basin Authority (ACUMAR) and an Integrated Plan to clean the river 
basin. The Supreme Court ordered a series of public hearings in which all the parts in the case 
got the chance to present their view and participate in the public discussion about the plan to 
clean the river. This process lasted two years, from June 2006 until July 2008.  
 
On 8 July 2008 the Supreme Court handed down its landmark judgement, in which it 
acknowledged the legal responsibility of the National Government, the Province of Buenos 
Aires and the City of Buenos Aires to restore the environment, prevent future environmental 
harm and improve the lives of the people living in the river basin area, and ordered them to 
implement a program of public policies to clean the river, based on the Integral Plan to clean 
the river that had been discussed in the public hearings. The Judgement ordered the 
Ombudsman and the five NGOs to form a monitoring committee to ensure citizen control 
with the implementation of the Judgement, and a federal judge in charge of judicial control 
with the implementation process. The way in which the Supreme Court responded to the 
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claims first voiced into the legal system was rather innovative. The Supreme Court ordered 
the policy-makers to address a problem that had previously been ignored. This led to 
fundamental institutional changes and to changes in the policy-making process. In the 
analysis of the implementation process, we got an understanding of how the judgement was 
put in practice, and the dynamics that explain why implementation of the judgement is 
challenging. The analysis is based on rich data material, from for instance interviews with key 
informants, official policy documents, reports, other secondary sources and scholarly 
literature.  
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The findings in the more systematic assessment of the effects of the litigation process were 
surprising. Reading reports on compliance published by the monitoring committee first gave 
me an impression that the Judgement has had little material effect. However, when I began to 
analyse and search for direct, indirect, material and symbolic effect according to the 
framework, I began to see that the litigation process has had a remarkable policy impact.  
 
Among the direct material effects, we see the authorities working on an Integrated Plan to 
clean the river and the inclusion of the Ombudsman and NGOs in public hearings. Some 
noteworthy instructional changes were made, such as the formation of an inter-jurisdictional 
River Basin Authority (ACUMAR). Several official enforcement mechanisms were set up, 
such as a monitoring committee and the appointment of a federal judge to control the 
implementation of the judgment. There have been improvements in the funding for the project 
to clean the river, and for the works of infrastructure such as water and sanitation. On the 
other hand, the conduct of the policymakers has only partly changed, and the companies have 
not considerably changed their conducts. The judgment has also had (at least) one direct 
symbolic effect, in that it has made people perceive the pollution problem as a violation of the 
right to a healthy environment.   
 
The judgement has also lead to many indirect effects. Among the indirect material effects we 
see that new actors, such as NGOs and the Ombudsman, have entered into the public debate 
and have been given the possibility to influence the policy-making process. The response by 
the Supreme Court has also lead to more advocacies on the right to a healthy environment, 
and twin cases are filed to the courts. There has also been increased media attention and 
public deliberation about the topic. In addition to all of this, we find some indirect symbolic 
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effects, such as transforming public opinion about the urgency and gravity of the pollution 
problem, due to more media attention on the topic. Some have also noticed changes in the 
litigants’ ideas, perception and collective social construct regarding environmental suffering. 
The litigation and response by the Supreme Court have also to a large degree legitimized the 
litigants’ view on health problems caused by pollution. In sum, the litigation process has had 
a considerable policy impact.  
 
The situation for the population living in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin has not changed 
since the landmark judgement on 8 July 2008, and the political authorities responsible for 
implementing the judgement have only partially complied with the terms of the judgement. 
However, we cannot expect too much with regard to compliance at this early stage of the 
implementation process of such a complex judgement, and it is too early to say if the case has 
been successful or not. If the lack of compliance would persist, a neorealist approach may 
conclude that the hope placed on the court as a mean to solve the problem has been 
ineffective, and that the Mendoza case has had no policy impact. However, this in-depth 
qualitative analysis of the Mendoza case, which employed an interpretive approach and 
looked for broader policy impact, suggests that in addition to substantial and direct material 
effects, the litigation has had remarkable indirect and symbolic effects that are just as 
noteworthy. These findings are similar to the findings in a study of a structural case in 
Colombia. Assessing policy impact of litigation is troubled with uncertainty, and there is 
always a danger of giving too much or too little explanatory power to litigation in comparison 
with parallel processes. When assessing the policy impact of the Mendoza case in light of 
parallel processes, I found that parallel processes form part of the explanation in many of the 
observed changes, particularly for indirect and symbolic effects. 
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This analysis shows that the indirect and symbolic policy impact of structural cases may be 
noteworthy, and it adds to our understanding of the broader policy impact of litigation. This 
study can be used to generalize our understanding of policy impact of litigation to a larger set 
of similar cases, that is to say structural public interest litigation cases. This gives implications 
for further research on structural cases, and this study of the Mendoza case may be used 
comparatively in forthcoming studies on structural judgements. 
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